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The Anticipation Misconception 
 
Colin P. Marks1 
 
I.Introduction 
 
Imagine that your client calls to obtain advice regarding 
the adequacy of the warnings and instructions on a new medical 
product prior to releasing the product on the market.  After 
reviewing the product, its warnings and background information, 
you prepare drafts of a memorandum and make numerous notes to 
yourself regarding the possible legal liability associated with the 
product.  Finally, you send the client a memorandum outlining 
your thoughts and advice for reducing litigation risks.  Some years 
later, litigation arises surrounding the product and the plaintiffs 
request to see the memorandum you prepared regarding potential 
liability as well as any notes and materials used to create such 
memorandum.  Your client refuses to produce the requested 
memorandum and materials on the grounds that it is protected by 
both the attorney client privilege and work product doctrine.  
Though the memorandum may seem to be clearly protected by the 
attorney-client privilege, does the work product doctrine truly 
apply?  And are the attorney’s notes, drafts and research trails that 
were not shared with the client protected under the work product 
doctrine?  The likely answer to these questions is “no” simply by 
virtue of the fact that they may not be deemed to have been 
prepared in “anticipation of litigation,” as that term is often 
 
1
 Associate Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law.  J.D., 
University of Houston Law Center; B.S. University of Missouri–Columbia.  
This article was selected as a winner of the 2010 Southeast Association of Law 
Schools Call for Papers Competition.  I would like to thank and acknowledge 
the hard work and assistance of my research assistants, Jason Goss, Rusty 
Hoermann, Matt Johnson and Sarah Minter, in researching and writing this 
article.   I would also like to thank my wife Jill, daughter Savannah, and son 
George for their love and support. 
 
COLIN P. MARKS – THE ANTICIPATION  MISCONCEPTION 3/10/2010  11:52:04 AM 
 
2 
 
interpreted as litigation being more than a remote possibility.2  
Adding to this confusion is disagreement upon whether the 
materials sought must be created in preparation of litigation or if it 
is permissible that some other business purpose also played a role 
in their creation, the latter being excluded under the term 
“anticipation of litigation” in some jurisdictions. 
Many commentators and courts have cited to the Supreme 
Court decision of Hickman v. Taylor as the genesis of the work 
product doctrine and the requirement that, to be afforded 
protection, the material in question must be generated “in 
anticipation of litigation.”3  The oft quoted policy justification for 
the protection afforded is that attorneys should be allowed a “zone 
of privacy” within which to prepare their case for the client.4  This 
 
2See, e.g., Diversified Indus. Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 603-04 (8th Cir. 
1977) (emphasizing that “anticipation of litigation” is the keystone to work 
product protection, and denying work product protection to a document that was 
clearly opinion work product, but prepared before litigation was anticipated).  
3See, e.g., Liesa L. Richter, The Power of Privilege and the Attorney-Client 
Privilege Protection Act: How Corporate America has Everyone Excite About 
the Emperor’s New Clothes, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 979, 1031 (2008) (citing 
to the Hickman decision as support that “the work-product doctrine provides 
additional protection for the work product of an attorney made in anticipation of 
litigation.”); Latieke M. Lyles, Cooperation or Coercion?: Why Selective 
Waiver is Needed in Government Investigations, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1291, 
1297 (2008); Keith Paul Bishop, The McNulty Memo – Continuing the 
Disappointment, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 729, 731 n.10; Thomas C. Pearson, 
Investigations, Inspections, and Audits in the Post-Sox Environment, 86 NEB. L. 
REV. 43, 96 n.348 (2007); Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: 
Beyond the Myth, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1255, 1295 (2006); Pacific Fisheries, Inc. 
v. United States, 539 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2008); Miccosukee Tribe of 
Indians of Florida v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008); 
Dairyland Power Co-op v. United States, 79 Fed.Cl. 709, 721 (Fed. Cl. 2007); 
AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 444-45 (Fed. Cl. 2007); 
Regional Airport Authority of Louisville v. LFG, L.L.C., 460 F.3d 697, 713 
(6th Cir. 2006); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 454 F.3d 511, 520 (6th Cir. 2006); 
Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 668 (10th 
Cir. 2006); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Oct. 22, 2001, 282 F.3d 156, 160 
(2d Cir. 2002); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 924 
(8th Cir. 1997); Cabot v. United States, 35 Fed.Cl. 442, 445 (Fed. Cl. 1996). 
4See, e.g., Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. U.S., 69 Fed.Cl. 784, 789 (Fed. Cl. 
2006) (asserting that the work product doctrine is intended to preserve a zone of 
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justification supports limiting protection to only work generated 
“in anticipation of litigation,” because, presumably, outside of this 
context there is no need for the “zone of privacy.”  However, a 
closer reading of Hickman reveals that, though the facts of that 
case involved preparation for trial, the Supreme Court placed no 
such limit on the scope of protection afforded an attorney’s 
“mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories,”5 
known as “core” work product.  In fact, the Supreme Court made 
very clear that such materials should be afforded special 
protection, above and beyond that afforded “ordinary” work 
product, which includes “written or oral information transmitted to 
the attorney and recorded as conveyed by the client.”6  
Furthermore, though the “zone of privacy” justification was used 
by the Court, a much broader concern for the effect discovery of 
such materials would have on the attorney-client relationship was 
also articulated. 
This policy concern shares much in common with the 
instrumental policy justification that is at the heart of the attorney-
client privilege.  Thus, a review of Hickman reveals at least two 
commonly held misconceptions about that case: 1) that it requires 
“core” work product to be produced in “anticipation of litigation” 
before protection can attach and 2) that the sole justification for 
the protection is to create a “zone of privacy” within which the 
attorney can work.  Together, these misconceptions have produced 
problems that should be of concern to both the practitioner and 
academic.  From a practical standpoint, these misconceptions have 
 
privacy where an attorney can prepare and develop his legal strategy); Hobley 
v. Burge, 433 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 2006) (identifying the purpose of the work 
product doctrine as establishing a zone of privacy in which lawyers can analyze 
their case free from interference by an adversary); Hanson v. U.S. Agency for 
Intern. Development, 372 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2004) (indicating that the 
work product doctrine serves to provide a zone of privacy within which to plan 
for a case); United States. v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(stating the purpose of the work product doctrine is to preserve a zone of 
privacy in which an attorney can prepare their case);United States v. AT&T 
Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
5FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
6In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 163 (6th Cir. 1986). 
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limited the scope of coverage given to the attorney’s “core” work 
product causing problems with knowing what in the attorney’s file 
will be discoverable.  Furthermore, as different jurisdictions have 
adopted varying standards, attorneys must deal with a lack of 
uniformity when it comes to protecting work product.  
Academically, these misconceptions are troubling because they 
have resulted in a system that encourages forum shopping and 
creates distinctions without any meaning or justification. 
This article examines both the work product doctrine’s 
historical and philosophical roots to determine whether the 
“anticipation of litigation” requirement should be a bar to 
protection of “core” work product from discovery.  Part II 
examines the current state of the work product doctrine through 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) and case law and 
compares the doctrine with the attorney-client privilege.  Part II 
concludes by demonstrating how “core” work product can be 
discovered despite the protection of these two doctrines.  Part III 
examines the Hickman v. Taylor case within its historical context, 
starting with the enactment of the first Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1938 and concluding with an analysis of the Court’s 
decision itself.  Part IV discusses the subsequent interpretations of 
Hickman v. Taylor, and how the “anticipation of litigation” 
requirement, or anticipation misconception, got its start through, 
of all things, a student note in the Harvard Law Review.  Part IV 
concludes with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s interpretations 
of Rule 26(b) as it currently exists. 
Finally, Part V examines the “anticipation of litigation” 
requirement in light of this historical development and proposes 
that the requirement is unjustified historically, philosophically and 
as a matter of policy.  Part V, therefore, proposes that, with regard 
to core work product, a new exception be established, or rather 
recognition that an old exception continues to exist.  This 
exception, based upon Hickman, would afford “core” work 
product a residuum of protection from discovery, regardless of the 
context in which it was created, so long as it was created by an 
attorney in his or her role of providing legal assistance.  Such an 
exception to discovery would grant “core” work product a 
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privileged status similar to that received by attorney-client 
communications, a result that makes sense when the instrumental 
policy justification for the doctrine is taken into account.  
Recognition of this protection will be more in keeping with the 
holding of Hickman and will help dispel uncertainty as to the 
scope of the doctrine due to the various readings courts have given 
to the term “anticipation of litigation.” 
II.The Work Product Doctrine 
 
Before delving into the historical and philosophical 
underpinnings of the work product doctrine, a brief overview of 
the doctrine as it stands today is necessary to demonstrate how the 
anticipation of litigation requirement can be problematic.  Because 
parties often seek to protect material under both the work product 
doctrine and the attorney-client privilege, a brief review of the 
attorney-client privilege is in order as well as a discussion of how 
these protections differ.  Although these doctrines cover slightly 
different materials, their philosophical underpinnings actually 
have much in common. 
 
A.Work Product Doctrine Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(3) 
 
1. The scope of work product protection 
 
In short, the work product doctrine grants a qualified 
privilege to the work product of a party or its agents.7  While the 
work product doctrine in the civil context has its roots in the 1946 
United States Supreme Court case of Hickman v. Taylor, today the 
 
7Chiasson v. Zapata Gulf Marine Corp., 988 F.2d 513, 514 n.2 (5th Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 474 (1996); Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. 
Dist. Court for Dist. of Arizona, 881 F.2d 1486, 1494 (9th Cir. 1989); 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Phillippines, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 
1991); Charles M. Yablon & Steven S. Sparling, United States v. Adlman: 
Protection for Corporate Work Product?, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 627, 633 (1998); 
Jeff A. Anderson et al., The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 760, 
762 (1983). 
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Hickman decision has been partially codified in Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(b)(3).8  Rule 26(b)(3) provides: 
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. 
(A) Documents and Tangible Things. Ordinarily, a 
party may not discover documents and tangible 
things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation 
or for trial by or for another party or its 
representative (including the other party's attorney, 
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent). 
But, subject to Rule 26(b)(4), those materials may 
be discovered if: 
(i) they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 
26(b)(1); and  
(ii) the party shows that it has substantial need for 
the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without 
undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent 
by other means.  
 
(B) Protection Against Disclosure. If the court 
orders discovery of those materials, it must protect 
against disclosure of the mental impressions, 
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party's 
attorney or other representative concerning the 
litigation.9  
 
The rule has been summarized as giving a qualified privilege to 
materials that are “(1) documents and tangible things otherwise 
discoverable, (2) prepared in anticipation of litigation, (3) by or for 
another party or by or for that other party’s representative.”10  
Though the first of these elements only speaks in terms of 
 
8FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(3); EDNA S. EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT AND 
WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE 795 (5th ed. ABA 2007).  The Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure offer a similar protection through Rule 16(b)(2).  Fed. R. 
Crim. Pro. 16(b)(2); EPSTEIN, supra at 795.  Though this article will focus on 
the civil rules, reference may be made at some points to the work product 
doctrine in criminal context. 
9FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(3). 
10EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 797; Anderson, supra n. 7, at 792. 
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“documents and tangible things,” the protection also is afforded to 
intangible things such as the recollections of an attorney or party 
requested through an interrogatory via the original Hickman 
decision.11 
The second requirement that work product be “prepared in 
anticipation of litigation” presents difficulties in interpretation.  
Courts have responded to this by adopting a variety of approaches 
for when something actually meets this criteria.12  As one 
commentator has noted, there appears to be, at its core, two factors 
required for work product protection to apply: “there must be a 
threat of litigation and there must be a motivational component.”13  
As for the first factor, one issue that arises is whether the action 
threatened qualifies as “litigation.”  The Federal Rules do not 
define “litigation,” but courts generally have broadened the term to 
apply beyond merely litigation is federal district courts so as to 
extend to other “adversarial proceedings.”14  Thus, documents 
prepared for compliance with federal securities laws have not been 
 
11EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 815; RICHARD L. MARCUS, The Story of Hickman: 
Preserving Adversarial Incentives While Embracing Broad Discovery, in CIVIL 
PROCEDURE STORIES, at 349 (2d ed. Foundation Press 2008, Kevin M. Clermont 
editor); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
2024 (West 1994); In re Cendant Securities Litig. 343 F.3d 658, 662-63 (3d Cir. 
2003); In re Grand Jury, 473 F.2d 840, 845-46 (8th Cir. 1973);  Henry S. 
Noyes, Federal Rule of Evidence 502: Stirring the State Law of Privilege and 
Professional Responsibility with a Federal Stick, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 673, 
762 (2009). 
126 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE - CIVIL § 26.70 
(3d ed. 2007) (section authored by Patrick E. Higginbotham) (“Courts have 
devised various formulations regarding just how concrete the prospect of 
litigation must be before protection will attach to a given document.”); 
Anderson,  supra n 7,  at 845. 
13EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 825 (citing Marten v. Yellow Freight Sys., 1998 WL 
13244, at *10 (D. Kan. 1998)). 
14EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 826-27; Jerold S. Solovy et al., Protecting Confidential 
Legal Information: A Handbook for Analyzing Issues Under the Attorney 
Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 797 PLI/Lit 225, 491 (2009); 
Willingham v. Ashcroft, 228 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2005); Deseret Mgmt. Corp. v. 
United States, 76 Fed.Cl. 88, 92-93 (Fed.Cl. 2007). 
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afforded work product protection,15 nor have the notes of an 
attorney taken during a conference call with the Food and Drug 
Administration regarding the failure rate of a medical device 
because no investigation was pending, and thus the documents 
were not prepared for “litigation.”16  Similarly, documents 
prepared in anticipation of a governmental investigation have not 
been granted work product protection,17 but once a governmental 
investigation has actually commenced, the work product doctrine 
may apply as the prospect of litigation is no longer remote.18 
This leads to yet another problem with applying the work-
product doctrine; when is litigation “anticipated”?  The term 
“anticipation” is also not defined by the Federal Rules leading 
courts to again apply various standards.  Analyzing whether work 
product was produced in anticipation of litigation often requires an 
inquiry into both the temporality of the threatened adversarial 
proceeding as well as an inquiry into the second motivational 
factor cited by above.19  As to the temporality of the litigation, 
where a proceeding has actually been initiated, the requirement is 
met, but the doctrine does not require that a suit be filed for the 
 
15Biddison v. Chicago, 1989 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3991, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1989); 
EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 829-30 (citing same). 
16In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. 130, 156 (D. Mass. 2004); EPSTEIN, 
supra n. 8, at 830 (citing same). 
17In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. 130, 147 (D. Mass. 2004); Guzzino v. 
Felterman, 174 F.R.D. 59, 63 (W.D. La. 1997); WRIGHT ET AL., supra n. 10, § 
2024; EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 831. 
18Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Minebea Co., 918 F. Supp. 491, 513 (D.N.H. 1996); 
EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 831-32 (citing same).  See also In re Int’l Sys. & 
Controls Corp. Securities Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1239 and n.4 (5th Cir. 1982); 
United States v. Amerada Hess Corp. 619 F.2d 980, 987 (3d Cir. 1980); Garrett 
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1996 WL 325725, at *3 (S.D. N.Y. 1996) (citing  
Martin v. Bally’s Park Place Hotel and Casino, 983 F.2d 1252, 1261 (3d Cir. 
1993)). 
19EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 836; Equal Rights Center v. Post Properties, Inc., 247 
F.R.D. 208, 210 (D. D.C. 2008); Fago v. M&T Mortgage Corp., 242 FRD 16, 
23 (D. D.C. 2007); Amway Corp. v. The Procter & Gamble Co., 2001 WL 
1818698, at *6 (W.D. Mich. 2001); Evans v. Atwood, 177 F.R.D. 1, 6 (D. D.C. 
1997). 
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protection to apply.20  It is in this pre-suit context that the 
temporality requirement is at its most chimerical.  It is often stated 
that the chance of litigation must be more than a mere 
possibility.21  “In general . . . a party must show more than a 
remote prospect, an inchoate possibility, or a likely chance of 
litigation.”22  Courts, however, vary on the level of temporality 
they will require, with some courts requiring a very high level of 
imminence while others seem content with a much lesser degree of 
imminence.23  For instance, some courts have interpreted “in 
anticipation of litigation” to mean that protection will only extend 
to work product prepared “under the supervision of an attorney in 
preparation for the real and imminent threat of litigation or trial.”24  
However, other courts have quoted a more liberal standard, 
requiring that there exists “a subjective belief that litigation was a 
real possibility, and that belief must [be] objectively reasonable,”25 
or an even less demanding standard that the alleged work product 
was prepared “with an eye toward litigation.”26  This variance in 
the stringency of what qualifies as work product, due to when 
litigation is “anticipated,” has created a lack of uniformity across 
 
20Epstein, supra n. 8, at 837; United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1200 (2d 
Cir. 1998); Grinnell Corp. v. ITT Corp., 222 F.R.D. 74, 78 (S.D. N.Y. 2003); 
Collins v. Mullins, 170 F.R.D. 132, 135-36 (W.D. Pa. 1996). 
21Solovy et al., supra n. 14, at 492; John M. Burman, The Work Product 
Doctrine, WYOMING LAWYER 38, 41, April 2006; Diversified Indus., Inc. v. 
Meredith 572 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1978); Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat’l Corp., 64 
F.R.D. 688, 690 (S.D. N.Y. 1974). 
22In re Gabapentin Patent Litig., 214 F.R.D. 178, 183 (D.N.J. 2003). 
23Epstein, supra n. 8, at 850-51; Anderson, supra n. 7, at 845-46. 
24Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 2006 WL 266599 at *10 (D. Kan. 
2006); Banks v. United States, 2005 WL 974723 at *3 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (“In 
determining whether documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation, the 
court should consider whether the documents would not have been generated 
but for the pendency or imminence of litigation.”). 
25In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2006); Martin v. Bally’s Park Place 
Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d 1252, 1260 (3d Cir. 1993); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. 
v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992). 
26United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing to 
Hickman); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D. D.C. 1982). 
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judicial districts and has the undesirable effect of increasing the 
likelihood of forum shopping. 
Even if the documents are prepared for an adversarial 
proceeding qualifying as “litigation” and the temporality 
requirement is met, protection will not be afforded if the 
motivation for creating the document was not based upon the 
threatened litigation.  For instance, many documents may have 
been produced for a business purpose, as well as for litigation.  
Such dual-purpose documents raise doubts as to whether the 
documents were truly created in anticipation of litigation.27  There 
is a split between circuits as to what is the correct degree of 
motivation required.  The Fifth Circuit has articulated a standard 
for “anticipation of litigation” whereby the privilege can apply 
where litigation is not imminent, “as long as the primary 
motivating purpose behind the creation of the document was to aid 
in possible future litigation.”28  The Second Circuit, in United 
States v. Adlman, has rejected the “primary motivating purpose” 
test and instead opted for the “because of” rule whereby 
“documents should be deemed prepared ‘in anticipation of 
litigation,’ . . . if in light of the nature of the document and the 
factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be 
said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of 
litigation.”29  The standard adopted by the Second Circuit is a 
direct adoption of the standard advanced by Charles Wright and 
 
27See, e.g., Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 200 F.R.D. 661, 674 (D. Kan. 
2001) (stretching the concept of creation for a business purpose by finding that 
the defendant, R.J. Reynolds was in the business of litigation, and thus, 
“documents prepared in the ordinary course of that business of litigation 
without a tie to specific litigation are not protected by work product 
immunity.”). 
28United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981).  But see In re 
Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Roxworthy, 
457 F.3d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2006); Martin v. Bally’s Park Place Hotel & Casino, 
983 F.2d 1252, 1260 (3d Cir. 1993); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet 
Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992). 
29Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202-03 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in 
original) (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 2024, at 343 (1994)). 
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Arthur Miller in their treatise Federal Practice and Procedure.30  
Wright and Miller encourage adoption of the “because of” 
standard, stating, “the test should be whether, in light of the nature 
of the document and the factual situation in the particular case, the 
document can be fairly said to have been prepared or obtained 
because of the prospect of litigation.”31  Indeed, a number of 
circuits have joined the Second Circuit in adopting this approach 
in varying contexts, including the First,32 Third,33 Seventh,34 
Eighth,35 Ninth36 and D.C. Circuits.37  The standard itself could be 
open to multiple interpretations, however, and has not created a 
uniform standard. 
   
2. Production of work product under 26(b)(3)(ii) 
 
As has already been noted, the work product doctrine is not 
a true privilege but a qualified privilege.  Thus, even if a party has 
carried its burden and shown the applicability of the work product 
doctrine, that does not end the inquiry.  The party seeking 
production then carries the burden of showing the applicability of 
26(b)(3)(ii), i.e.  a substantial need for the materials to prepare its 
case and an inability to obtain it by other methods without undue 
hardship.38 
In applying this rule, courts make a distinction between 
ordinary or “fact” work product and “opinion” or “core” work 
product.39  Ordinary work product has been defined as the “written 
 
30WRIGHT ET AL., supra n. 11, at § 2024. 
31Id. 
32State of Maine v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2002). 
33Montgomery County v. MicroVote Corp., 175 F.3d 296, 305 (3d Cir. 1999). 
34Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 976-77 (7th Cir. 1996). 
35PepsiCo, Inc. v. Baird, Kurtz & Dobson L.L.P., 305 F.3d 813, 817 (8th Cir. 
2002). 
36In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Mark Torf/ Torf Environ. Mgmt.), 357 F.3d 900, 
907 (9th Cir. 2004). 
37E.E.O.C. v. Lutheran Social Serv., 186 F.3d 959, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
38FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(3)(ii); Epstein, supra n. 8, at 811. 
39In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 
294 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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or oral information transmitted to the attorney and recorded as 
conveyed by the client.”40  Such ordinary work product may be 
obtained, despite the privilege, by meeting the above test, i.e. upon 
a showing of substantial need and an inability to otherwise obtain 
the privileged work product without material hardship.41  But 
courts, based on the language of Rule 26(b) and the Hickman 
decision itself, give special protection to core work product.  
“[A]bsent waiver, a party may not obtain the ‘opinion’ work 
product of his adversary; i.e., ‘any material reflecting the 
attorney’s mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, judgments, 
or legal theories.’”42  Thus, core work product enjoys a greater 
level of protection than fact or ordinary work product but even the 
extent of that heightened protection is somewhat unclear.  While 
some courts have articulated an absolute protection to “core” work 
product, many others, including the United States Supreme Court, 
have stopped short of affording it such status.43 
B.The Work Product Rule Distinguished From Attorney-Client 
Privilege 
 
1.The attorney-client privilege and how it is applied 
 
In diversity cases, federal law mandates that state law 
governs the attorney-client privilege.44  However, if the court’s 
jurisdiction is premised upon a federal question, the attorney-client 
privilege is defined by federal common law.45  The elements of the 
attorney-client privilege are satisfied: “(1) Where legal advice of 
any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in his 
 
40In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 163 (6th Cir. 1986). 
41Toledo Edison Co. v. G.A. Technologies, Inc., 847 F.2d 335, 339-40 (6th Cir. 
1988); Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 744 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir. 1984).    In 
this sense, the work-product privilege is not an absolute privilege, but more akin 
to a qualified privilege.  EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 797. 
42In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F. 3d at 294 (quoting In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 
805 F.2d at 163-64). 
43EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 947-50. 
44FED. R. EVID. 501. 
45See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Jaffee v. 
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1996). 
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capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, 
(4) made in confidence (5) by the client (6) are at his instance 
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or the legal 
advisor, (8) unless the protection is waived.”46  A more succinct 
statement of the privilege is that a party must show: “(1) a 
communication; (2) made between privileged persons; (3) in 
confidence;(4) for the purpose of seeking, obtaining, or providing 
legal assistance to the client.47 
 
46Banner v. Hamilton, 99 Fed.Appx. 29, 36 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing to Reed v. 
Baxter, 134 F.3d 351, 355-56 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Bisanti, 414 F.3d 
168, 171 (1st Cir. 2005) (articulating nearly identical standard). 
47EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 65 (citing Restatement, The Law Governing Lawyers § 
118 (Tentative Draft No.1, 1988)); Wilson v. Foti, 2004 WL 744874 at * 2 
(E.D. La. 2004) (citing EPSTEIN); see also Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 395 
(discussing elements of confidentiality and communication); Fisher v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (confidential disclosures by a client to an 
attorney made in order to obtain legal assistance are privileged); Colin P. 
Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective 
Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth Having at All?, 30 SEATTLE L. REV. 155, 158 
(2006).  Though individual state and federal courts have articulated variations 
of this standard, these four basic prongs remain consistent.  For instance, the 
Third Circuit in In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979) 
described the elements as: 
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become 
a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made 
(a) is the member of the bar of court, or his subordinate and 
(b) in connection with this communication is acting as a 
lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the 
attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the 
presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily 
either (i) an opinion of law or (ii) legal services or (iii) 
assistance in some legal preceding, and not (d) for the propose 
of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been 
(a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client. 
Id. at 1233.  Though this standard adds some nuances, such as the crime-fraud 
exception to the privilege, the basic standard remains the same.  Furthermore, 
though this standard is articulated in terms of communications from a client to 
an attorney, the privilege also covers communications from an attorney to a 
client.  Lewis v. UNUM Corp. Severance Plan, 203 F.R.D. 615, 618 (D. Kan. 
2001) (citing Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1370-71 (10th 
Cir.1997)). 
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There are a few notable exceptions to the privilege.  
Disclosure of communications to third parties can lead to a waiver 
of the privilege.48  Also the communication must be for the 
purpose of securing legal advice as opposed to securing general 
business advice.49  Where an in-house counsel also serves in a 
business role, the inquiry can be difficult, requiring a hard look 
into whether the communication was made for a business as 
opposed to a legal purpose.  “Business communications are not 
protected merely because they are directed to an attorney, and 
communications at meetings attended or directed by attorneys are 
not automatically privileged as a result of the attorney’s 
presence.”50  Thus, in cases where in-house counsel serve a dual 
legal/business role, courts will look at the nature of the 
communication to determine whether the primary purpose of the 
communication was to provide legal assistance.51 
 
48Marks, supra n. 47, at 159. 
49Id. 
50Kramer v. Raymond Corp., 1992 WL 122856 at * 1 (E.D. Pa. 1992). At one 
time, many federal courts adopted a “control group” test to determine if 
communications between corporate employees and the corporate counsel were 
covered by the privileged.  See Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. at 42-43. Under this test, 
“the privilege applied if the employee making the communication was in a 
position to control or take a substantial part in a decision about any action 
which the corporation might take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he was 
an authorized member of a body or group which had the authority, such that he, 
in effect, personified the corporation.”  Marks, supra, n. 47, at 162.  However, 
this approach was squarely rejected by the Supreme Court in 1981 in Upjohn 
Company v. United States.  449 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1981); National Converting 
& Fulfillment Corp. v. Bankers Trust Corp., 134 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 n. 1 
(N.D. Tex. 2001).  Today, under federal law, “communications from lower 
echelon employees are within the privilege as long as the communications are 
made to the attorney to assist him in giving legal advice to the client 
corporation.”  Marks, supra n. 47, at 163; Painewebber Group, Inc. v. 
Zinsmeyer Trusts Partnership, 187 F.3d 988, 991-92 (8th Cir. 1999); United 
States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 538 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Upjohn, 449 
U.S. at 391-92). 
51Kramer v. Raymond Corp., 1992 WL 122856 at * 1 (E.D. Pa. 1992); MSF 
Holding, Ltd. v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int’l, 2005 WL 3338510 at *1 (S.D. N.Y. 
2005); Avianca, Inc. v. Corriea, 705 F.Supp. 666, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  Two 
other notable exceptions are that underlying facts are not protected, Upjohn, 449 
U.S. at 395-96; United States v. Rakes, 136 F.3d 1, *3-4 (1st Cir. 1999); Rhone-
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2. Policy justifications for the attorney-client privilege 
 
The attorney-client privilege has been said to be one of the 
oldest existing legal privileges, dating back to ancient Rome, 
where it was initially used as a means to prevent an attorney from 
being called as a witness in his client’s case.52  The justifications 
for the attorney-client privilege have evolved over the years.  
Today, the most commonly cited policy supporting existence of 
the privilege is that open and frank communications with an 
attorney facilitates compliance with the law.53  Thus, the privilege 
exists to promote full disclosure by the client and to foster a 
relationship of trust between the attorney and the client.54  This 
justification has been labeled an “instrumental” one in that the 
privilege serves as an instrument, or a means, to an end – that end 
being communications between attorney and client.55  At its heart, 
this justification is based upon an assumption that without the 
 
Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 862 (3d Cir. 1994), and 
the privilege does not apply to communications concerning an intended or 
continuing crime under the crime-fraud exception.  See JOHN WILLIAM 
GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 4.03 (3d ed. 2001).   
52JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 1.04 
at 1-3 - 1-4 (3d ed. 2001).   Wigmore described the privilege as being an 
accepted part of English law, however, this notion has come under attack as 
being inaccurate and possibly was nothing more than a makeweight to 
“distinguish [the attorney client privilege] from those that Wigmore chose to 
deprecate as ‘novel privileges.’”  CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT AND KENNETH W. 
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 
5472 (2d ed. West 2005) (1977). 
53Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061 (1978) (“The privilege is also considered 
necessary to the lawyer’s function as confidential counselor in law or the 
similar theory that the legal counselor can properly advise the client what to do 
only if the client is free to make full disclosure.”).   
54Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 
(1985); Palmer v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 861 P.2d 895, 904-05 (Mont. 1993). 
55EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 
5.1.1 at 257 (Aspen 2002). 
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privilege, clients will not disclose necessary facts to the attorney.56  
Thus, the privilege has been described, from a cost-benefit stand-
point, as cost-free to society as, without the privilege, the evidence 
at issue would not have been disclosed and discoverable in the 
first place.57 
Not surprisingly, because the attorney-client privilege is 
based upon an assumed benefit, it has been criticized as 
speculative and its benefits called into question.58  This has caused 
some commentators to offer up alternative, “non-instrumental” 
justifications for the privilege, such as a humanistic privacy 
justification.59  Imwinkelried distinguishes this justification from 
Wigmore’s noting that, “[u]nlike Wigmore’s theory, the 
humanistic rationale does not rest on the factual assumption of a 
causal connection.  Rather, the rationale is that it is desirable to 
create certain privileges out of respect for personal rights such as 
autonomy or privacy.”60  This privacy concern mirrors a primary 
justification that is often cited to when explaining the work 
product doctrine – the benefits of having a “zone of privacy” 
within which an attorney can work.  Nonetheless, this humanistic 
policy justification has not overtaken the instrumental justification 
 
56Id. at § 5.1.1 at 258; Swindler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408 
(1998). 
57IMWINKELRIED, supra n. 55, at §5.1.1, at 258.  Interestingly, at one time, the 
paradigm for this justification was in the context of a trial lawyer being 
consulted for the purposes of litigation, before the rise of the in-house counsel, 
but the justification has been extended to the in-house counsel context as well.  
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra n. 52, at § 5472; Vincent C. Alexander, The 
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN'S 
L. REV. 191, 267-68 (1989) (“Interestingly, for several decades of its common 
law existence, the attorney-client privilege encompassed only communications 
relating to the litigation in which the lawyer's testimony was sought. It was not 
until the mid-1800s that the privilege was held to include communications 
relating to ‘legal advice of any kind’.”); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2294 
(McNaughton rev.ed.1961). 
58WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra n. 52, at § 5472; IMWINKELRIED, supra n. 55, at 
§5.2.1, at 266-67. 
59WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra n. 52, at § 5472; IMWINKELRIED, supra n. 55, at 
§5.1.2. 
60IMWINKELRIED, supra n. 55, at §5.1.2, at 259. 
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and the Supreme Court has continued to cite approvingly to the 
instrumental justification in recognizing new privileges.61 
 
3. Coverage under the attorney-client privilege versus 
the work product doctrine 
 
It has been said that the scope of the work product doctrine 
is both broader than and narrower than the attorney-client 
privilege.62  It is broader in that it extends to materials beyond just 
communications.63  However, it is narrower in that it only extends 
to materials created “in anticipation of litigation.”64  In some 
 
61Id. at § 5.1.1, at 258; Jafee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1996); United 
States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1989). 
62Compare United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975)(“[T]he 
work-product doctrine is distinct from and broader than the attorney-client 
privilege.”) and In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 
293 F.3d 289, 304 (6th Cir. 2002) and In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 
619, 624 (4th Cir. 1988) with In re OM Sec. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 579, 587 (N.D. 
Ohio 2005) (noting, inversely, that the attorney-client privilege is broader than 
the work product doctrine).  See also Fred A. Simpson, Has the Fog Cleared? 
Attorney Work Product and the Attorney-Client Privilege: Texas’s Complete 
Transition into Full Protection of Attorney Work in the Corporate Context, 32 
ST. MARY’S L. J. 197, 225-26 (2001) (“The work product doctrine provides a 
greater area of protection than the attorney-client privilege. In spite of its broad 
application, work product does not protect documents or tangible items not 
created in anticipation of litigation.”); Kevin Mark Smith, Preventing Discovery 
of Internal Investigation Materials: Protecting Oneself From One’s Own 
Petard, 69 J. KAN. B. ASSOC. 28, 35 (2000) (“Because the work product 
doctrine is narrower in scope than the attorney-client privilege in that it only 
applies when litigation is ongoing or pending, an entity must next determine 
whether the investigation is being conducted as a result of pending litigation.”); 
Kim J. Gruetzmacher, Comment, Privileged Communications with 
Accountants: The Demise of United States v.  Kovel, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 977, 
989 (2003) (“The attorney work product doctrine is at once broader and 
narrower than the attorney-client privilege.”). 
63In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 304 (“[T]he ‘work product doctrine is 
distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege’ and extends beyond 
confidential communications between the attorney and client to ‘any document 
prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for the attorney.’”). 
64Gabriel L. Imperato, Internal Investigations, Government Investigations, 
Whistleblower Concerns: Techniques to Protect Your Health Care 
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instances, this coverage may overlap.  For instance, in the 
hypothetical posited at the beginning of this article in which 
litigation over a client’s product ensued, a memorandum prepared 
and given to the client assessing the merits of the pending case or 
cases would likely have dual coverage under both the attorney-
client privilege (as the memorandum is a communication) and the 
work product doctrine (as the memorandum was created in 
anticipation of litigation).  But returning to the documents at issue 
in the introductory hypothetical, would there be any protection for 
the drafts of a memorandum and attorneys’ notes in his or her file 
regarding the possible legal liability?  Any memoranda that are 
given to the client may come under the protection of the attorney-
client privilege, but drafts, notes, and possibly even research trails 
created by the attorney could all be subject to discovery.  Though 
these materials will all likely contain or reflect the mental 
impressions of the attorney, they were created pre-launch, at a 
time when litigation was remote.  In other words, though the 
materials may represent core work product, to fall under the 
protection of the work product doctrine, even core material must 
be produced “in anticipation of litigation.”65 
This limitation can pose a significant problem for the 
transactional attorney.  As Professor Roger Kirst has noted, 
It seems unlikely that a transaction document will 
be found to have been created in anticipation of 
litigation as required by Rule 26(b)(3) to meet the 
 
Organization, 51 ALA. L. REV. 205, 216 (1999) (“The key to this protection is 
that the work must be performed in anticipation of litigation.”). 
65CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, FEDERAL 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §2026 (2009) (“As with all assertions of work-
product protection, opinion work product is guarded against discovery only if 
prepared in anticipation of trial; mental impressions of an attorney in service of 
other objectives, such as negotiation of a transaction, are not protected.”); Duke 
T. Oishi, A Piece of Mind for Peace of Mind: Federal Discoverability of 
Opinion Work Product Provided to Expert Witnesses and its Implications in 
Hawai’i, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 859, 864 (2002); Ettie Ward, The Litigator’s 
Dilemma: Waiver of Core Work Product Used in Trial Preparation, 62 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 515, 516-17 (1988); Anderson et al., supra n. 7, at 820; Robert 
D. Stokes, Discovering Investigative Reports Under the Work Product 
Doctrine, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 156, 159-60 (1982). 
COLIN P. MARKS – THE ANTICIPATION  MISCONCEPTION 3/10/2010  11:52:04 AM 
 
19 
 
definition of litigation work product. That leaves 
the attorney-client privilege as the obvious ground, 
so lawyers regularly rely on that privilege and 
assert that the transaction documents they wrote or 
edited are protected from discovery by the attorney-
client privilege. Thus, the issue in the federal 
caselaw on discovery of transaction work product 
has been whether such material is privileged. The 
federal courts have almost always held that the 
federal law of the attorney-client privilege does not 
protect documents that do not reveal the client's 
confidential communications.66 
The case of Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp.67 illustrates the difficulty 
of protecting attorney work product in a patent prosecution 
context.  In Hercules, Hercules sued Exxon for infringement of a 
patent that disclosed a type of artificial rubber.68  During 
discovery, Hercules refused to produce 255 requested documents 
claiming that the documents were protected by either the attorney-
client privilege or work product doctrine.69  The district court 
began its inquiry by classifying the documents into categories such 
as “Documents relating to the prosecution of the application for 
the patent in suit,” or documents relating to a particular 
interference suit.70  The court then analyzed the documents under 
 
66Roger W. Kirst, A Third Option: Regulating Discovery of Transaction Work 
Product Without Distorting the Attorney-Client Privilege, 31 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 229, 230 (2000).  See also Unted States v. Naegele, 468 F.Supp.2d 
165,170 (D.D.C. 2007) (“When there is no intent that the communication 
remain confidential, the privilege does not attach.”); In re Keeper of the 
Records, 348 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The privilege protects only those 
communications that are confidential and are made for the purpose of seeking 
or receiving legal advice.”); Santrade, Ltd. v. G.E. Co., 150 F.R.D. 539, 542 
(E.D. N.Car. 1993) (noting same); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum 
Dated September 15, 1983, 713 F.22d 1032, 1037 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[The 
attorney-client] privilege does not impede disclosure of information except to 
the extent that the disclosure would reveal confidential communications.”). 
67434 F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977). 
68Id. at 141-42. 
69Id. at 142. 
70Id. 
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the attorney-client privilege finding that a number of the 
communications were not covered by the privilege, in part due to 
the communications not being premised upon the rendering of 
legal advice.71  The court then turned to the work product doctrine, 
analyzing the documents in light of the “anticipation of litigation” 
requirement.72  Though the court agreed that an adversarial 
proceeding included a patent interference proceeding, it stopped 
short of finding that a document prepared to aid in the prosecution 
of a patent qualified under the “anticipation of litigation” 
requirement.73 
The scope of that privilege is still limited, however, 
by the requirement that the document be prepared 
“with an eye toward litigation.”  The prosecution of 
an application before the Patent Office is not an 
adversary, but an ex parte proceeding.  Although 
the process involves preparation and defense of 
legal claims in a quasi-adjudicatory forum, the 
give-and-take of an adversary proceeding is by and 
large absent.74 
Thus, the court held that a number of the documents, including 
drafts with attorneys’ handwritten notes, were subject to 
discovery.75 
Hercules demonstrates how documents, even ones that 
record the mental impressions of attorneys acting in their legal 
capacity, will fail to garner protection under the work product 
doctrine if litigation is not anticipated.  However, transactional 
 
71Id. at 147-48.  It is not entirely clear if the documents may have been subject 
to discovery due to some other reason; the court discussed the argument that 
some of the communications may not have been to individuals covered by the 
privilege but dismissed this attack.  Id. at 145-47.  The court then discussed the 
requirement that the attorney “is ‘acting as a lawyer’ giving advice with respect 
to the legal implications of a proposed course of conduct,” and then concluded 
that “[o]n the basis of the foregoing, the following documents are not protected 
by the attorney-client privilege: . . ..”  Id. at 147-48. 
72Id. at 150-51. 
73Id. at 151-52. 
74Id. 
75Id. at 152. 
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attorneys are not the only ones who face the prospect of their 
mental impressions being open to discovery.  As has already been 
noted, documents created in anticipation of a government 
investigation, but prior to the commencement of the investigation 
have also been found to be beyond the scope of the work product 
doctrine.76  Indeed, even when a problem has arisen, documents 
may not be said to be prepared in anticipation of litigation if the 
prospect is still deemed remote. 
For instance, in the case of In re Grand Jury Subpoena,77 a 
case which in many ways mirrors the hypothetical proposed in the 
introduction, a corporation was under investigation by a grand jury 
for distributing adulterated and misbranded medical devices in 
violation of provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(“FDCA”).78  The device at issue had initially been approved by 
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) in 1998 for 
manufacture, but prior to, and during the initial period of shipping 
the devices, it was discovered that the devices were failing both in 
routine tests and in actual shipped devices.79  After a series of calls 
involving the corporation’s officers, attorney and the FDA, among 
others, the corporation decided to withdraw production of the 
 
76In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. 130, 158-59 (D. Mass. 2004); Guzzino 
v. Felterman, 174 F.R.D. 59, 63 (W.D. La. 1997); Epstein, supra n. 8, at 831 
(citing Guzzino).  See also In re Bank One Securities Litig., 209 F.R.D. 418. 
425 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that documents prepared in response to an 
investigation by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency were not protected 
by the work product doctrine because the documents “were not prepared due to 
the anticipation of litigation, but rather [arose] from the evolution of business 
activities at Bank One as a result of an OCC inquiry.”); In re The Leslie Fay 
Cos. Securities Litig., 161 F.R.D. 274, 280 (S.D. N.Y. 1995) (holding that 
documents prepared by an audit committee in light of an SEC investigation 
were not protected by the work product doctrine because the investigation by 
the audit committee “was not  conducted primarily in anticipation of litigation . 
. ..”) (emphasis in original). 
77220 F.R.D. 130 (D. Mass. 2004). 
78Id. at 133.  To ensure that readers of the opinion could not learn the identity of 
the corporation or other parties involved, the court created fake names such as 
XYZ Corporation.  Id. at 134, n.1. 
79Id. at 134. 
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device.80  The grand jury sought to compel the corporation’s 
attorney to produce the notes he took during these calls with the 
FDA.81  The corporation and attorney resisted and sought a 
protective order claiming the notes were protected under the work 
product doctrine.82 
After an extensive review of the work product doctrine, 
including its various applications in different jurisdictions, the 
court ultimately denied the protective order finding that the notes 
were not produced in anticipation of litigation.83  What is striking 
about the court’s decision, however, is its rather blunt statement 
that the notes were classic core work product.  The court stated, 
There can be little doubt that if prepared in 
anticipation of litigation, an attorney's notes of 
conference calls between a client and a regulatory 
agency are the sort of materials that the work 
product doctrine protects. Indeed, they typically 
qualify as opinion work product, because “when 
taking notes, an attorney often focuses on those 
facts that she deems legally significant.”84 
But despite the fact that the notes were clearly taken by the 
attorney to aid him in fulfilling his duties to his client, the court 
nonetheless found them discoverable.  The court ruled that the 
notes were not generated in “anticipation of litigation” as the FDA 
 
80Id. at 136-40. 
81Id. at 133. 
82Id. 
83Id. at 156-62.  The court noted that the corporation and its attorney were in a 
Catch-22 of sorts in that if they claimed they anticipated either a lawsuit or 
adverse FDA action, this would be based on failures in the field of the device 
which would put the company out of compliance with the FDCA and thus the 
notes could be discoverable under the crime-fraud exception.  Id. at 157-58.  
Ultimately, the court concluded that the corporation and attorney had a weak 
anticipation showing and had also failed to show that the notes were produced 
because of the prospect of litigation.  Id. at 162. 
84Id. at 155-56 (quoting Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 209 F.3d 1051, 1054 (8th 
Cir. 2000)). 
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had not actually begun an investigation and the prospect of private 
litigation was not likely at the time the documents were created.85 
What is striking about both Hercules and In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena is that in each case, the court recognized that the 
documents sought reflected the mental impressions of an attorney 
acting in his or her capacity as legal counsel, yet the courts denied 
protection of the work product doctrine on an assumption that 
work product, even core work product, can only be protected if it 
was generated “in anticipation of litigation.” 86  This raises a rather 
basic question of whether the assumption that the “anticipation of 
litigation” requirement applies to “core” work product is correct or 
even justified.  The remainder of this article discusses the origin of 
what is, in fact, a misunderstanding of the protection that should 
be afforded core work product. 
 
III.The Genesis of the Work-Product Rule 
 
As with most articles that address the work-product 
doctrine, a discussion of the seminal case of Hickman v. Taylor is 
in order.  However, a mere recitation of the Supreme Court’s 
holding does not do justice to the nuances of the rule or the 
purposes for which it was created.  To truly understand Hickman, 
it is necessary to set-up the historical context in which it was 
decided as well as the state of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
as they existed at that time. 
 
85Id. at 157-62 (stating that “the possibility of litigation must be more than 
inchoate”). 
86Id. at 155-62; Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp. 434 F. Supp. 136, 151-52 (D.C. 
Del 1977).  See also Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d 596, 603-04 (“That the 
contents of the report constituted ‘work product’ cannot be denied; nor is there 
any question that the report contained the mental impressions, conclusions and 
opinions of those who wrote it, including their interpretations of what the 
interviews with individuals revealed.  However, it was obvious that the Law 
Firm’s work was not done in preparation for any trial, and we do not think that 
the work was done in “anticipation of litigation,” as that term is used in Rule 
26(b)(3), although, of course, all parties concerned must have been aware that 
the conduct of employees of Diversified in the years past might ultimately result 
in litigation of some sort in the future.”). 
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A.The first Rules of Federal Civil Procedure and their 
purpose 
 
The first Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938.87  
Prior to the adoption of these rules, discovery procedures were 
severely limited.  The adversarial process reigned supreme and 
gamesmanship was the order of the day in litigation.88  Thus, all 
discovery, including what would later be termed “work product,” 
was often unavailable to the other side except in circumstances 
where a court might equitably find that compulsion was required.89  
It was in this setting that Roscoe Pound, then Dean of the 
University of Nebraska’s College of Law, gave a speech to the 
American Bar Association questioning the propriety of a system 
that valued the adversarial system over justice.90  This speech 
apparently helped initiate efforts which led to the adoption of the 
Rules Enabling Act of 1934.91 
The first rules covered a variety of matters, including 
discovery.  The rules represented a stark contrast to the 
gamesmanship that had existed prior to their adoption, and indeed, 
 
87Martin v. Bally’s Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 
1993); Furman v. Cirrito, 782 F.2d 353, 355 (2d Cir. 1986); Henley v. F.M.C. 
Corp., 189 F.R.D. 340, n. 8 (S.D. W.Va. 1999); Naragon v. Dayton Power & 
Light Co., 934 F. Supp. 899, 903 (S.D. Ohio 1996); Montalvo v. Hutchinson, 
837 F. Supp. 576, 577 (S.D. N.Y. 1993); In re Watford, 192 B.R. 276, 279 
(Bank. M.D. Ga. 1996). 
88Marcus, supra n. 11, at 326-27; Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-501 
(1947) (noting the cumbersome methods of obtaining discovery prior to the 
Federal Rules). 
89Marcus, supra n. 11, at 326-27; Jay S. Goodman, On the Fiftieth Anniversary 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: What Did the Drafters Intend?, 21 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 351, 360 (1987) (noting that “before the new rules, federal 
discovery was virtually nonexistent . . ..”). 
90Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration 
of Justice, 29 A.B.A. Rep. 395, 404-05 (1906); Marcus, supra n. 11, at 326 
(quoting Pound); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 909, 944-48 (1987). 
91Marcus, supra n. 11, at 328 (quoting John H. Wigmore,  Roscoe Pound’s St. 
Paul Address of 1906, 20 Judicature 176, 176 (1938). 
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it appears there were a number of courts that were wary of them.92  
With regard to discovery, the rules formally provided for when 
depositions could be taken and their scope,93interrogatories to be 
served94 and for the production of documents and things.95  
 
92Symposium, Discovery Procedure 5 F.R.D. 403, 418-19 (“As I think everyone 
in this room knows, under the old practice, before the Rules, the trial of a 
lawsuit was more like a sporting proposition: If you got the better lawyer, you 
had a better chance of winning; if you could conceal all the facts, you had a 
better chance of winning.”) (1946); Marcus, supra n. 11, at 329 (quoting 
Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 217 n.6 (1945)). 
93FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (1938) (amended 1948).  Rule 26 read, in pertinent part, 
(a) When Depositions May be Taken. By leave of court after 
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over 
property which is the subject of the action or without such 
leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any 
person, whether a party or not, may be taken at the instance of 
any party by deposition upon oral examination or written 
interrogatories for the purpose of discovery or for use as 
evidence in the action or for both purposes. The attendance of 
witnesses may be compelled by the use of subpoena as 
provided in Rule 45. Depositions shall be taken only in 
accordance with these rules. The deposition of a person 
confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on 
such terms as the court prescribes.(b) Scope of Examination. 
Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by Rule 
30(b) or (d), the deponent may be examined regarding any 
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action, whether relating to the claim 
or defense of the examining party or to the claim or defense of 
any other party, including the existence, description, nature, 
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or 
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons 
having knowledge of relevant facts. 
Id. 
94FED. R. CIV. P. 33 (1938) (amended 1948).  Rule 33 provided, 
Any party may serve upon any adverse party written 
interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the 
party served is a public or private corporation or a partnership 
or association, by any officer thereof competent to testify in 
its behalf. The interrogatories shall be answered separately 
and fully in writing under oath. The answers shall be signed 
by the person making them; and the party upon whom the 
interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of the 
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Though these rules made exceptions for privileged materials,96 
meaning documents revealing attorney-client communications 
would remain protected under the attorney-client privilege, the 
rules made no exception for documents prepared in the course of 
preparing for litigation.  In the absence of a rule on point, courts 
 
answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within 15 
days after the delivery of the interrogatories, unless the court, 
on motion and notice and for good cause shown, enlarges or 
shortens the time. Objections to any interrogatories may be 
presented to the court within 10 days after service thereof, 
with notice as in case of a motion; and answers shall be 
deferred until the objections are determined, which shall be at 
as early a time as is practicable. No party may, without leave 
of court, serve more than one set of interrogatories to be 
answered by the same party. 
Id. 
95FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1938) (amended 1948).  Rule 34 provided, 
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and 
upon notice to all other parties, the court in which an action is 
pending may (1) order any party to produce and permit the 
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of 
the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, 
books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible 
things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence 
material to any matter involved in the action and which are in 
his possession, custody, or control; or (2) order any party to 
permit entry upon designated land or other property in his 
possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, 
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any 
designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order 
shall specify the time, place, and manner of making the 
inspection and taking the copies and photographs and may 
prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. 
Id. 
96See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (“…the deponent may be examined regarding any 
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action…”) (emphasis added); FED. R. CIV. P.  34 (“the court…may (1) 
order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or 
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated 
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible 
things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any 
matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody, or 
control…”) (emphasis added).  
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soon began to adopt a variety of approaches on how to deal with 
such materials. 
Though the “work product” problem was not the only 
troublesome issue faced by the first rules, it was certainly one of 
the most controversial and the Advisory Committee to the Federal 
Rules soon began to explore language to address the issue.97  
Courts dealing with objections to the production of such materials 
generally fell into one of two camps.  Some courts held that such 
materials must be produced, regardless of whether they were 
produced by an attorney or by a third party employed by the party 
claiming protection.98  The Advisory Committee noted that a 
number of cases, however, had protected such materials from 
discovery, though the reasons were hardly uniform.99  As the 
Committee noted, 
Thus it has been held by some courts that 
statements obtained from witnesses, parties or 
others are not material as evidence, or are hearsay 
and inadmissible, and discovery has been denied. . . 
. Some courts have also emphasized what they 
thought to be the unfairness of letting the other 
 
97Marcus, supra n. 11, at 329; Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 354-55 
(1946). 
98Bowles v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Blank v. Great Northern 
Ry. Co., 4 F.R.D. 213 (D.Minn. 1943); In re Matter of The Examination of 
Citizens Casualty Co. of New York, 3 F.R.D. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Revheim v. 
Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp., 2 F.R.D. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Seligson v. 
Camp Westover, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Matthies v. Peter F. 
Connolly Co., 2 F.R.D. 277 (E.D.N.Y .1941); Colpak v. Hetterick, 40 F.Supp. 
350 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); Kane v. News Syndicate Co., Inc., 1 F.R.D. 738 
(S.D.N.Y. 1941); Price v. Levitt, 29 F.Supp. 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1939); Bough v. 
Lee, 29 F.Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Kulich v. Murray, 28 F.Supp. 675 
(S.D.N.Y. 1939); Bough v. Lee, 28 F.Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).  See also 
Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District 
Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 457 (1946) (listing above cases as 
supporting discovery of work product materials); Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 
212, n.8 (3d Cir. 1946) (summarizing cases where discovery was permitted). 
99Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District 
Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 457-59 (1946). 
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party, through discovery, obtain free of charge the 
material gathered or prepared by his adversary; that 
to permit such a course would penalize diligence 
and put a premium on laziness; and that discovery 
should not constitute a “fishing expedition.”. . . 
Some courts have held that it is improper to seek 
any evidentiary matter gathered by or for the 
adversary party after commencement of the action. 
. . . And a number of cases, as to particular matters 
to be discovered, have either denied the discovery 
because no reason or cause therefor was shown 
regarding the data sought, or denied discovery on 
the general principle that no inquiry should be 
made into the adversary's preparation of his case 
for trial.100 
Thus courts were split as to what to do with material generated 
when litigation was pending.  It was within this context that the 
Hickman case was decided.  
 
B. Hickman v. Taylor at the trial and appellate level 
 
On February 6, 1943 a tug boat named the J.M. Taylor, 
owned by the partnership of Taylor & Anderson, capsized killing 
five of the seamen on board including Norman Hickman.101  Soon 
after the accident, Taylor & Anderson hired an attorney, Mr. 
Fortenbaugh, to defend the partnership in any subsequent suit that 
might arise in connection with the sinking of the J.M.Taylor.102  
On March 4, 1943, a steamboat inspector’s hearing was held 
where the four surviving members of the crew testified and 
immediately after the hearing, Fortenbaugh interviewed these 
witnesses himself and obtained written statements from them.103  
Fortenbaugh also interviewed other relevant witnesses “and in 
 
100Id. at 458-59 (internal citations omitted). 
101Hickman, 4 F.R.D. at  480-81; Marcus, supra n. 11, at 332-33 
102Hickman, 4 F.R.D. at 481; Marcus, supra n. 11, at 333. 
103Id. 
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some cases made memoranda of what they told him.”104  
Thereafter, settlements were reached with representatives of three 
of the five dead seamen.105 
On November 26, 1943, Hickman’s father, as administrator 
of his son’s estate brought suit against Taylor & Anderson under 
the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, alleging his son’s death resulted 
from Taylor & Anderson’s negligence.106  Pursuant to Rule 33, the 
plaintiff requested that Taylor & Anderson produce copies of any 
statements made by members of the crew taken after the 
accident.107  Taylor & Anderson refused claiming that the 
interrogatory called for “‘privileged matter obtained in preparation 
of litigation.’”108  The district court subsequently held a hearing 
where Fortenbaugh testified by deposition on how and why the 
statements were made.109 
In defending its refusal to produce the statements, the 
defendants cited to Stark v. American Dredging Co.,110 where the 
district court denied production of statements of witnesses made in 
preparation for trial.111  Judge Kirkpatrick, sitting with an en banc 
panel of the entire Eastern District, refused to recognize a broad 
 
104Id. 
105Id. 
106Id. at 480; Marcus, supra n. 11, at 334.  Curiously, the district court referred 
to Hickman as the plaintiff’s wife, which Richard Marcus points out is 
incorrect.  Marcus, supra n. 11, at 334, n.43.  As Marcus also points out, suit 
was also filed against Baltimore & Ohio Railroad (“B&O”).  Id. at 332.  B&O 
were the owners of a sunken car float which the J.M. Taylor had been hired to 
tow across the Delaware River the night of the accident.  Id. 
107Hickman, 4 F.R.D. at 480.  The interrogatory read,  
‘State whether any statements of the members of the crews of 
the Tugs ‘J. M. Taylor’ and ‘Philadelphia’ or of any other 
vessel were taken in connection with the towing of the car 
float and the sinking of the Tug ‘John M. Taylor.’ Attach 
hereto exact copies of all such statements if in writing, and if 
oral, set forth in detail the exact provisions of any such oral 
statements or reports.' 
 Id. (quoting interrogatory #38). 
108Id. 
109Id. 
1103 F.R.D. 300, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1943). 
111Hickman, 4 F.R.D. at 481-82. 
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sweeping protection from discovery of all things produced in 
anticipation of litigation.112  In doing so the court first noted the 
liberal scope of discovery under the Rules, stating “[t]he guiding 
principle is the broad conception of the Rules that discovery of all 
matters relevant to a suit should be allowed to the fullest extent 
consistent with the orderly and efficient functioning of the judicial 
process.”113  The court then went on to distinguish the Stark 
decision as simply recognizing that the Rules granted the court 
discretion to limit production but then disapproved Stark in that it 
placed a burden on the party seeking production to show “good 
cause.”114  The court then reformulated the rule as “[u]nless, under 
the circumstances of any particular case, the Court is satisfied that 
the administration of justice will be in some way impeded, 
discovery will be granted when asked.”115 
Turning to the statements at issue, the court first noted that 
any firm would conduct an investigation to determine its own 
ship’s seaworthiness and whether its employees were 
responsible.116  Though the court did not state so expressly, it 
appears that the court was implying that business concerns could 
have driven the investigation.  Whether the statements were 
prepared in anticipation of litigation or not, the court nonetheless 
felt that they should be produced.  Though the court noted that it 
could not compel production of materials within the traditional 
boundaries of the attorney-client privilege, it found that the 
statements to Fortenbaugh were not covered by this privilege.117  
Without the protection of this privilege, the court found that the 
 
112Id. at 481-82 (“We do not regard that [Stark] decision as laying down a hard 
and fast rule that statements obtained for [preparation for trial] are privileged, or 
exempt from production for any other reason.”). 
113Id. at 481. 
114Id. at 482. 
115Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
116Id. 
117Id.  The court gives little explanation on this point but it is worth noting that 
status of the attorney-client privilege as it related to businesses was very much a 
matter of debate until the Supreme Court case of Upjohn.  Under the Upjohn 
formulation of the rule, it is very possible that the statements made to 
Fortenbaugh would be privileged.  See part II.B.1., n.46, supra. 
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statements should be produced under the broad scope of discovery 
under the Rules.118  Interestingly, the court did place an important 
limit on this discovery; the court limited discovery of 
Fortenbaugh’s “mental impressions, opinions, legal theories and 
other collateral matter” and held that the court should review the 
produced materials and only produce those portions “containing 
facts obtained from witnesses which it considers to be within the 
proper scope of discovery.”119  The court thus ordered production 
of the witness statements to the court for such a determination to 
be made.120  Taylor & Anderson and Fortenbaugh refused to 
produce the statements and were found in contempt of court by the 
assigned judge.121 
The district court’s ruling was appealed to the Third 
Circuit and was heard en banc.122  As an initial matter, the 
appellate court noted that the promulgation of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure had indeed introduced a sea change in the way 
discovery was to be conducted.123  The court summarized, 
We must discard, for instance, the concept that 
there is something close to a property right in the 
information which the lawyer digs up about the 
client's case and has in his possession.  We must 
also discard the notion that questions from the other 
side can be fended off on the ground that the 
opponent's lawyer is simply engaged in a fishing 
expedition.  These notions are hard to get rid of, but 
we take it that they are contrary to the idea of this 
discovery portion of the Federal Rules.124 
 
118Hickman, 4 F.R.D. at 482. 
119Id. at 483. 
120Id. 
121Marcus, supra n. 11, at 336; Hickman, 153 F.2d at 214.  This actually created 
a desirable result for the defendants as the order to produce the statements, 
which normally would not be eligible for interlocutory appeal, was now 
immediately reviewable.  Marcus, supra n. 11, at 336; Hickman, 153 F.2d at 
214. 
122Hickman, 153 F.2d at 214. 
123Id. at 216-17. 
124Id. (internal footnotes omitted). 
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But despite the broad purpose of the Rules in facilitating the 
discovery process, the appellate court expressed concern over the 
unfettered production of materials which might impinge upon the 
attorney-client relationship.125  Of particular concern was the 
possibility that an attorney could be called as a witness in the same 
case in which he was acting as an advocate to verify the content of 
a witness statement.126  Though such a situation was frowned upon 
by the Canons of Ethics, the appellate court noted that the Rules’ 
“privilege” exceptions (which prevented the discovery of 
privileged material) did not cover the statements at hand as the 
statements were made by third parties and not by clients.127  
District courts addressing the issue had split as to how to handle 
the production of such materials, leaving the Third Circuit with no 
clear direction.128  Nonetheless, the court held that “intangible 
things, the results of the lawyer’s use of his tongue, his pen, and 
his head, for his client,” material which the court termed “work 
product of the lawyer,” were covered by the exception to 
privileged material under the Rules.129  The Third Circuit justified 
this extension of the term “privileged” on public policy grounds, 
stating, 
Those members of the public who have matters to 
be settled through lawyers and through litigation 
should be free to make full disclosure to their 
advisers and to have those advisers and other 
persons concerned in the litigation free to put their 
whole-souled efforts into the business while it is 
carried on.130 
 
125Id. at 219-220. 
126Id. 
127Id. at 220 and 222.  As noted above, the statements from Taylor & 
Anderson’s employees could arguably be privileged under a modern 
construction of the attorney-client privilege.  See supra n. 117. 
128Id. at 220.  The appellate court, in a lengthy footnote, summarized the 
varying decisions and their reasoning.  Id. at n.13. 
129Id. at 223. 
130Id. (internal footnotes omitted) (citing Wigmore (3d ed.) § 2291 (advocating 
that the policy of the attorney client privilege necessarily involves full 
disclosure; “[i]n order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by 
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C. Development of The “Work Product” Doctrine by the 
Advisory Committee and under Hickman v. Taylor 
 
While Hickman was working its way through the court 
system, the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules was busy 
attempting to reach a resolution via rule-making to the “work 
product” problem.131  At first, the Committee adopted an approach 
that seemed much more in line with those cases holding that broad 
discovery should be allowed into trial preparation materials.132  In 
its first preliminary draft of amendments to the Rules, proposed in 
1944, the Committee’s solution was to amend Rule 30(b) to 
provide for protective orders against discovery “into papers and 
documents prepared or obtained by the adverse party in the 
preparation of the case for trial.”133  The burden, however, of 
seeking the protective order was on the adverse party that was 
resisting the discovery request.134  One year later, the Advisory 
Committee proposed a second draft keeping the protective order 
approach to “work product” materials but with a more expansive 
explanatory note.135  The note explained that the purpose of the 
rule was to make clear that discovery of materials prepared in 
anticipation of litigation was permitted and that such materials 
were not privileged, but that the district courts would retain 
 
clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisors must be 
removed; and hence the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client’s 
consent.”)). 
131Anderson et al., supra n. 7, at 771-72. 
132Marcus, supra n. 11, at 330. 
133Advisory Committee on Rules For Civil Procedure, Preliminary Draft of 
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the 
United States 43 (1944); Marcus, supra n.11, at 330; Anderson, supra n.6, at 
772. 
134Advisory Committee on Rules For Civil Procedure, Preliminary Draft of 
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the 
United States 43 (1944); Marcus, supra n.11, at 330. 
135Advisory Committee on Rules For Civil Procedure, Preliminary Draft of 
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the 
United States 38-40 (1945); Marcus, supra n.11, at 331; Anderson, supra n.7, at 
772. 
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discretion to deny discovery into such materials via the protective 
order.136  However, as district courts were already divergent in 
their approaches on how to handle such materials, the lack of 
direction on how to exercise discretion as to whether to issue a 
protective order would lead to confusion; a fact recognized by the 
Committee without resolution at that time.137 
In 1946, the Committee, possibly in response to the 
vigorous debate that centered around the treatment of trial 
preparation material, changed its proposed amendment on how to 
treat such material.138  The new proposal amending Rule 30, which 
was very similar to the language contained in today’s Rule 
26(b)(3), read, 
The court shall not order the production or 
inspection of any writing obtained or prepared by 
the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor, 
or agent in anticipation of litigation or in 
preparation for trial unless satisfied that denial of 
production or inspection will unfairly prejudice the 
party seeking the production or inspection in 
preparing his claim or defense or will cause him 
undue hardship or injustice. The court shall not 
order the production or inspection of any part of the 
writing that reflects an attorney's mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal 
 
136Advisory Committee on Rules For Civil Procedure, Preliminary Draft of 
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the 
United States 38-40 (1945); Marcus, supra n.11, at 331; Anderson, supra n.7, at 
772. 
137Advisory Committee on Rules For Civil Procedure, Preliminary Draft of 
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the 
United States 39-40 (1945); Anderson, supra n.7, at 772. 
138Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 356 (1946) (“There is no 
Amendment about which there is a greater or stronger division of opinion 
among members of the Bar.”). 
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theories, or, except as provided in Rule 35, the 
conclusions of an expert.139 
This amendment was put forth without the opportunity for 
comment from the bar,140 but that is not to say that the Committee 
was without a clear understanding of the conflicting views on how 
trial preparation materials should be treated.141  Indeed, at a 1946 
symposium on discovery procedures held before the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals (the same circuit from which Hickman came), 
George Wharton Pepper, the vice-chairman of the Advisory 
Committee, noted that the amendment the Committee arrived upon 
was the result of debate between those who favored complete 
discovery and those who favored complete exclusion of trial 
preparation materials.142  As Mr. Pepper stated, “It seems to me, 
looking at the things as clearly as I can, that what the Committee 
has attempted comes about as near as possible to steering a middle 
course between two extreme views neither of which would give 
anything like general satisfaction to the bar.”143  How the 
Committee came upon the exact language used is also not entirely 
clear, though it was surely influenced by the district court 
decisions denying discovery based on good cause,144 as well as the 
 
139Report of Proposed  Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District 
Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 456-57 (1946); Report of the 
Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Recommending 
Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 356 (1946). 
140Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 340 and 356 (1946). 
141See, e.g., Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 356 (1946) (“[The 
Amendment] may be that this is the best that can be done if a position is to be 
taken between complete exclusion and complete discovery.”). 
142Symposium, Discovery Procedure, 5 F.R.D. at 406-07.  This symposium 
demonstrates the heated debate between the opposing views amongst the Bar.  
Among the speakers were Samuel Fortenbaugh, the attorney from Hickman 
(which at the time of the symposium was on appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court), advocating in favor of exclusion, id. at 408, and Mr. Abraham 
Freedman, who advocated in favor of discovery.  Id. at 418-26. 
143Id. at 407. 
144See Report of Proposed  Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the 
District Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 458-59 (1946) (noting that a 
number of cases had denied discovery “because no reason or cause therefor was 
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Hickman decisions themselves.145  The language in the 
amendment may also have been influenced by English law which 
did not permit the discovery of trial preparation materials.146  
Regardless of how it struck the balance in its proposal, the 
Committee had come to what it felt was a fair compromise and the 
decision was now left to the Supreme Court whether to either 
adopt the rule or deal with the problem through judicial decision-
making via the Hickman case, which was on appeal before the 
Supreme Court.147  The Court apparently chose the latter.148 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari based upon the divergence 
of views in the district courts on how to deal with trial preparation 
 
shown regarding the data sought, or denied discovery on the general principle 
that no inquiry should be made into the adversary's preparation of his case for 
trial” and listing the cases). 
145Id. at 459-60 (discussing Hickman).  In fact, the Committee expressed its 
doubts as to the result in the Third Circuit’s decision in Hickman, as the 
Committee believed that the term “privileged,” which the Circuit Court found to 
encompass trial preparation materials, was not intended to be used so broadly.  
Id. at 460 (“The Committee believes that the term ‘privileged’ as used in that 
rule was not designed to include anything more than that embraced within the 
rule of testimonial exclusion regarding privileged communications as developed 
under the applicable laws of evidence, both common-law and statutory.”); 
Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 356 (1946). 
146Symposium, Discovery Procedure, 5 F.R.D. at 414-418 (1946) (statements of 
Mr. Thomas E. Byrne and Mr. Harrison G. Kildare, both of the Philadelphia 
Bar, reciting English law excluding trial preparation documents).  Mr. Kildare 
noted that the “The time-tested English rule is embodied in effect in the first 
part of the proposed Addition to Rule 30(b), as follows: ‘The court shall not 
order the production or inspection of any writing obtained or prepared by the 
adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor, or agent in anticipation of 
litigation or in preparation for trial ***’” but criticized the qualification 
permitting the judge the discretion to allow discovery.  Id. at 418. 
147Report of Proposed  Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District 
Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 459-60 (1946); Marcus, supra n.11, 
at 331. 
148Marcus, supra n. 11, at 338; Advisory Committee’s Explanatory Statement 
Concerning Amendments of the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 499 (1969) 
(“In deciding the Hickman case, the Supreme Court appears to have expressed a 
preference in 1947 for an approach to the problem of trial preparation materials 
by judicial decision rather than by rule.”). 
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materials and noted the Advisory Committee’s Report on the 
problem.149  After initially dealing with the procedural irregularity 
of how the case came before it,150 the court turned to the merits by 
first noting, as had the district and appellate courts, that in keeping 
with the purpose of their promulgation, the discovery rules were to 
be read liberally.151  The Court noted, however, that discovery was 
not without limits, and that privileged materials would not be 
subject to discovery.152  But, the Court found that the materials at 
issue before them, the witness statements and Fortenbaugh’s 
recollections of those interviews, were not protected by the 
attorney-client privilege and that the word “privilege,” as used in 
the Rules, did not extend to material produced in anticipation of 
litigation.153  The court held,  
We also agree that the memoranda, statements and 
mental impressions in issue in this case fall outside 
the scope of the attorney-client privilege and hence 
are not protected from discovery on that basis. It is 
unnecessary here to delineate the content and scope 
of that privilege as recognized in the federal courts. 
For present purposes, it suffices to note that the 
protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to 
information which an attorney secures from a 
witness while acting for his client in anticipation of 
litigation. Nor does this privilege concern the 
memoranda, briefs, communications and other 
writings prepared by counsel for his own use in 
prosecuting his client's case; and it is equally 
unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney's 
 
149Hickman, 329 U.S. at 500 and n.1. 
150There was some question as to whether the case was even properly before the 
Court as the plaintiff had not properly attempted to depose Fortenbough under 
Rule 26, but the Court chose to move forward with the case rather than force the 
plaintiff to go through the empty formality of pursuing the correct procedural 
device.  Id. at 504-05. 
151Id. at 507 (“Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both 
parties is essential to proper litigation.”). 
152Id. at 508. 
153Id. 
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mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal 
theories.154 
Thus, as the Third Circuit had found the materials to be 
“privileged,” the Supreme Court had overruled the Third Circuit 
on this point. 
Though the materials were not privileged, the Supreme 
Court still found in favor of Taylor (and Fortenbaugh)155 based on 
its concern over the plaintiff’s attempts to delve into the files of 
the opposing attorney without any showing of necessity.156  The 
Court noted that the plaintiff was able to obtain information from 
the interrogatories and that nothing prevented the plaintiff from 
interviewing the same witnesses Fortenbaugh had interviewed.157  
The Court found this particularly disturbing because the plaintiff’s 
justification for requesting the material was to “help prepare 
himself to examine witnesses and to make sure that he has 
overlooked nothing.”158  The Supreme Court thus created a new 
rule that protected the “work product” of an attorney from 
discovery unless the party seeking disclosure could prove 
necessity and prejudice.159  The Court did not stop there, however, 
and went on to make a distinction between what it termed “non-
 
154Id. 
155Id. at 514. 
156Id. at 508-09. 
157Id.   
158Id. at 513. 
159Id. at 509, 511-512;  
We are thus dealing with an attempt to secure the production 
of written statements and mental impressions contained in the 
files and the mind of the attorney Fortenbaugh without any 
showing of necessity or any indication or claim that denial of 
such production would unduly prejudice the preparation of 
petitioner's case or cause him any hardship or injustice. 
Id. at 509.  See also In re San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 
1007, 1014 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Hickman as the genesis of the “substantial 
need/undue hardship standard”); Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 
1985) (same).  The Court defined work product as including that which was 
reflected in “interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental 
impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible 
ways.”  Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. 
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privileged facts” and production of “oral statements made by 
witnesses to Fortenbaugh, whether presently in the form of his 
mental impressions or memoranda,” which would, in today’s 
parlance, most likely be deemed “core” work product.160  As to the 
latter materials, the Court expressed its doubt as to whether any 
showing of necessity could be made to justify production but 
stopped short of giving such materials an unqualified immunity.161 
Reflecting upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Hickman, 
a few points are worth highlighting with regard to the scope and 
policy behind the protection the court afforded an attorney’s 
“work product.”  First, much of the materials that were being 
sought, and with which the Court was expressing concern over, 
would be termed “core” work product in modern parlance.  It also 
bears pointing out that though the materials at issue in Hickman 
were prepared in anticipation of litigation, the Court no where 
made this a set requirement for the protection afforded.  Indeed, 
the Court, if it so chose, could have easily recognized this 
requirement as it was before the Court as a proposed amendment 
to the Rules, and yet chose instead to address the issue through the 
Hickman decision which made no such qualification.162  In this 
vein, the Court did not confine its reasoning to the litigation 
context, but instead, in justifying the protection, described a 
lawyer’s role in terms of “performing his various duties,” 
protecting his “client’s interests” and “the giving of legal advice” 
as well as speaking in terms of preparing the client’s case.163 
Also, with regard to why the protection was necessary, the 
Court appeared to offer multiple justifications.  One was the most 
commonly cited “zone of privacy” justification, where the Court 
stated, 
 
160Id. at 511-12. 
161Id. at 512. 
162The Court did note that the English courts had developed a privilege covering 
“documents prepared by or for counsel with a view to litigation.”  Id. at 510, 
n.9.  However, though the Court noted this qualification in the English courts, 
the Supreme Court did not make such a qualification in its own opinion. 
163Id. at 510-11. 
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In performing his various duties, however, it is 
essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree 
of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by 
opposing parties and their counsel. Proper 
preparation of a client's case demands that he 
assemble information, sift what he considers to be 
the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his 
legal theories and plan his strategy without undue 
and needless interference. That is the historical and 
the necessary way in which lawyers act within the 
framework of our system of jurisprudence to 
promote justice and to protect their clients' 
interests.164 
This justification is based on a balancing of the merits of having a 
well-functioning adversarial system with open discovery.  This 
“adversarial” justification is apparent also in the Court’s concern 
over plaintiff’s counsel’s admission that he only wanted to obtain 
the materials in question to make sure he hadn’t missed 
something; in other words, so he could reap the benefits of 
Fortenbaugh’s insight and ability as a lawyer.165  This aligns with 
the concerns articulated by the Advisory Committee about 
achieving a proper balance between the two opposing views 
(complete exclusion versus complete discovery) of how such 
materials should be treated,166 but also seems to be a nod that to 
allow the production of such materials “penalizes the diligent,” 
and puts a “premium on laziness;” justifications that were 
sometimes used by district courts to support denying production of 
“work product” materials.167 
A second justification, that is often overlooked, however, 
is a concern over the effect on the legal profession itself and upon 
 
164Id. 
165Id. at 513. 
166Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 356 (1946). 
167Report of Proposed  Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District 
Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 458, 460 (1946).  The Advisory 
Committee, in formulating its proposed amendment, rejected these as tests for 
whether production should be denied.  Id. at 460. 
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the attorney-client relationship.  After articulating the adversarial 
justification for the protection, the Court went on to state, 
Were such materials open to opposing counsel on 
mere demand, much of what is now put down in 
writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's 
thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his 
own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices 
would inevitably develop in the giving of legal 
advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The 
effect on the legal profession would be 
demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and 
the cause of justice would be poorly served.168 
These considerations, which again seem to speak particularly to 
“core” work product, bear much in common with the instrumental 
policy justifications for having the attorney-client privilege.169  
The reference to not writing down a thought or fact for fear of 
discovery reflects a concern that the interests of a client would be 
negatively affected.  In his concurrence, Justice Jackson points out 
a further instrumental concern that production of such material 
could have the undesirable effect of forcing attorneys to take the 
witness stand in the case in which they are an advocate;170 a 
concern that also is mirrored in the policies underlying the 
attorney-client privilege. 
 
IV.Post Hickman Development of the Work Product Doctrine 
 
A.The road to rule 26(b)(3) and the anticipation 
misconception 
 
 
168Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. 
169See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. 
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege serves 
the function of promoting full and frank communications between attorneys and 
their clients.  It thereby encourages observance of the law and aids in the 
administration of justice.”); Guy v. United HealthCare Corp., 154 F.R.D. 172, 
177 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (quoting Weintraub); Marks, supra n. 47, at 157. 
170Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 517 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
COLIN P. MARKS – THE ANTICIPATION  MISCONCEPTION 3/10/2010  11:52:04 AM 
 
42 
 
Though the “anticipation of litigation” requirement was not 
articulated in the Hickman decision itself, the requirement soon 
found its way into district court opinions.  The case of Rediker v. 
Warfield,171 a 1951 District of New York opinion appears to be 
one of the earliest articulations of this requirement.  In Rediker, 
the plaintiff, an attorney, brought suit against Warfield and Scott, 
who were also attorneys, and also against the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development for allegedly interfering with 
a contract the plaintiff had with Ulen Realization Corporation to 
collect a claim from the Government of Iran.172  The plaintiff 
issued interrogatories regarding communications Warfield and 
Scott, as legal counsel for Ulen, had with International Bank.173  
Warfield and Scott resisted, in part, on the basis that the 
interrogatories would delve into material protected under the 
work-product doctrine.174  The court, citing to little more than the 
Hickman decision, denied affording work product protection, 
noting that the communications at issue “were not in the course of 
preparation for trial [nor] does it appear that they were in 
anticipation of prospective litigation.”175  The court went on to 
distinguish the case before it from Hickman on the basis that in 
Rediker, the attorneys were also the defendants.176  The court, 
however, gave little explanation as to why it was asserting an 
anticipation of litigation requirement other than its broad citation 
to Hickman. 
Despite its lack of explanation, the Harvard Law Review, 
in a 1961 student written survey of developments in discovery 
law, cited to the Rediker case (and only the Rediker case) to 
support the assertion that “[a]lthough work-product protection is 
not limited to material gathered after commencement of an action, 
it has been held to apply only when material is obtained in 
 
17111 F.R.D. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
172Id. at 126-27. 
173Id. at 127-28. 
174Id. 
175Id. at 128. 
176Id. 
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anticipation of litigation.”177  The Developments Note went on to 
justify the requirement, claiming, 
Since a lawyer who does not envision litigation will 
not anticipate discovery requests, the fear of 
disclosure should not affect the way in which the 
material is prepared.  For example, if the owner of 
real property employs an attorney to investigate the 
marketability of his title preparatory to offering it 
for sale, it seems that the fruits of the lawyer’s 
search should be fully discoverable if litigation 
relating to a subsequent sale contract should 
eventuate.  In such circumstances, as in all those in 
which a lawyer is asked to assist in planning future 
conduct, even though he might recognize the ever 
present possibility of litigation, he is prompted 
chiefly by his responsibility to avoid embroiling his 
client in controversy.178 
This reasoning, however, is flawed.  At best the justification is 
naïve as to the nature of the work of an attorney and at worst it is 
circular.  The reasoning is naïve in that it assumes that an attorney 
who is doing his or her job will not fear discovery of work product 
because the work product was produced to avoid litigation rather 
than to engage in litigation.  Yet, the very same material that was 
used to avoid litigation could just as easily assist an opponent in 
litigation as notes made in preparation for litigation.179  Indeed, the 
reasoning seems to ignore the Supreme Courts admonition that 
“[w]ere such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, 
much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. 
. . .The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And 
the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly 
served.”180 
 
177Developments in the Law – Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 1030 (1960-61) 
[hereinafter “Developments Note”] (emphasis added) (citing to the Rediker 
opinion as its only support for the statement). 
178Id. 
179Anderson, supra n. 7, at 788, n.175. 
180Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). 
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The reasoning could also be viewed as circular in that it 
seems to assume that an attorney who does his or her job will not 
end up in litigation and so there should be no fear of discovery.  
But for an attorney to best complete the tasks assigned by the 
client, the attorney must feel free to make notes and create work 
product without fear of discovery.  Thus, for attorneys to do their 
job, they must work without fear of discovery, which can only be 
done if they are doing their job.  The break-down of this reasoning 
may stem from what Professor Kirst identifies as a fundamental 
misreading of Hickman. 
The logic of the Developments Note is flawed at a 
fundamental level, because it depends on 
combining two ideas the Supreme Court had 
carefully separated in Hickman – whether the 
information is discoverable and whether the 
information can be discovered from the lawyer’s 
materials.  In Hickman the Court stressed that the 
information was routinely discoverable as a matter 
of course from the client.  The work product 
doctrine of Hickman was a limitation on routinely 
discovering the information from the lawyer’s 
materials.181   
Despite the fact that the Developments Note cites to no 
case to support its reasoning, it was cited the very next year in 
Colton v. United States182 by the Second Circuit which, based on 
the note and the Rediker opinion, held that for work product 
protection to apply, the materials must be produced in anticipation 
of litigation.183  In Colton, Edward Colton was an attorney 
engaged by Herbert and Mercedes Matters to assist them with their 
taxes.  The Matters were subsequently investigated by the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) and Colton was issued a summons by the 
IRS to testify and to produce “copies of income tax returns, 
workpapers, correspondence files, memoranda and all other data 
relating to the preparation and the filing of Federal Income Tax 
 
181Kirst, supra n.66, at 274. 
182306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962). 
183Id. at 640. 
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Returns for or on the behalf of [the Matters].”184  At an initial 
interview in response to the summons, Colton gave little 
information and refused to hand over documents claiming 
protection under the attorney-client privilege.185  Eventually, 
Colton agreed to answer some questions but still refused to answer 
others or hand over materials based upon the privilege.186  The 
court considered first the claim of attorney-client privilege and 
held that it did not protect many of the communications that 
pertained merely to the time period of representation and other 
matters that did not reflect legal advice.187  The court then turned 
to the documents which Colton claimed were protected as work 
product under Hickman.  Citing simply to Rediker and the 
Developments Note, the court held that such materials must be 
shown to be “collected or prepared in anticipation of litigation, . . . 
to justify invocation of this rule.”188 
Though the Second Circuit adopted “anticipation of 
litigation” as a threshold requirement, no other circuit courts 
appear to have adopted this standard prior to 1970, when the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to explicitly 
incorporate the work product doctrine, and the “anticipation of 
litigation” requirement into Rule 26(b)(3).  However, at least one 
circuit did recognize that “anticipation of litigation” was not a 
formal requirement under Hickman.  In Natta v. Hogan,189 a 
number of parties, including Phillips Petroleum Company, 
challenged the priority date of a patent held by Montecatini.190  
Montecatini sought to discover documents which Phillips claimed 
were protected under the attorney-client privilege and work 
product doctrine.191  The trial court denied protection under the 
work product doctrine as the documents were not prepared for 
 
184Id. at 634. 
185Id. at 635. 
186Id, at 636. 
187Id. at 637-38. 
188Id. at 640. 
189392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968). 
190Id. at 688. 
191Id. at 691, 693. 
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possible litigation.192  The Tenth Circuit rejected the trial court’s 
premise that litigation was an essential element of work product 
protection stating, 
Nothing in Hickman v. Taylor suggests that the 
work product rule is limited to preparation for 
proceedings in a court of record. The rationale for 
the work product doctrine is the prevention of 
unnecessary interference with the work of an 
attorney. An attorney's work in the patent law field 
should be as much his own as it is in other areas of 
the law. The work product claim cannot be brushed 
aside on the theory that the documents were not 
prepared for use in litigation.193 
The court went on to hold that though many of the tests and 
experiments that were conducted in connection with the patent 
application would be discoverable, the hand-written notes of 
attorneys were not, finding that “such materials prepared by an 
attorney during his consideration of a legal problem are within the 
work product doctrine.”194 
Though the Tenth Circuit appeared to approve of a 
standard for work product that took into account whether the 
material reflected an attorney’s consideration of a legal problem 
regardless of whether it was in “anticipation of litigation,” it could 
also be read to have simply not constrained work product to 
“proceedings in a court of record.”195  In other words, Natta may 
have done nothing more but expand work product to other 
adversarial proceedings.  The tone and wording of its 
interpretation seem to suggest otherwise, but in subsequent cases, 
such as the previously discussed Hercules opinion, courts 
distinguished Natta on the basis that it involved an interference 
proceeding, which was adversarial, and not simply the prosecution 
 
192Id. at 693. 
193Id. 
194Id. at 693-94 (citing Hickman).  Of the four hand written documents the court 
considered, it only extended protection to one as the others were not identified 
as being written by any particular attorney.  Id. at 694. 
195Id. at 693. 
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of a patent.196  If the Natta decision did create a circuit split, it 
seems to have gone unnoticed and the origin of the “anticipation 
of litigation” standard has not been questioned by the courts. 
Indeed, by the time the Advisory Committee on the 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was ready to 
re-examine the work product doctrine, it was not due to 
disagreement over the “anticipation of litigation” requirement but 
rather over whose work product was protected and the scope of 
Rule 34, which subjected discovery to a “good cause” 
requirement197 and how this applied, if at all, to the work product 
doctrine.198  Though the Advisory Committee had made some 
 
196Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 151-52 (D.C. Del. 1977 
(citing In re Natta, 48 F.R.D. 319, 321 (D. Del. 1969)). 
197Rule 34 read, in relevant part: 
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and 
upon notice to all other parties, . . . the court in which an 
action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and 
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on 
behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, 
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or 
tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain 
evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope of the 
examination permitted by Rule 26(b) and which are in his 
possession, custody, or control . . .. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1968) (amended 1970). 
198In developing a new rule to clarify the work product doctrine, the Advisory 
Committee recognized the problems that had arisen regarding the coverage of 
the work product doctrine stating, 
The major difficulties visible in the existing case law are (1) 
confusion and disagreement as to whether “good cause” is 
made out by a showing of relevance and lack of privilege, or 
requires an additional showing of necessity, (2) confusion and 
disagreement as to the scope of the Hickman work-product 
doctrine, particularly whether it extends beyond work actually 
performed by lawyers, and (3) the resulting difficulty of 
relating the “good cause” required by Rule 34 and the 
“necessity or justification” of the work-product doctrine, so 
that their respective roles and the distinctions between them 
are understood. 
Advisory Committee’s Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments of the 
Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 499-500 (1969). 
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failed efforts in the 1950s to address the issues raised by 
Hickman,199 it was not until 1967 that the amendments that led to 
the current rule began to develop.  An initial draft of the 
Committee’s amendment attempted to solve the recognized 
problems, in part, by making clear that work product protection 
extended beyond simply the work of the attorney.200  But 
curiously, the Committee’s solution to the “good cause” problem 
was to simply lump all work product together and subject it to the 
same standard – a “good cause” standard.201  The amendment read, 
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the 
provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party 
may obtain discovery of documents and tangible 
things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for 
trial by or for another party or by or for that other 
party's representative (including his attorney, 
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) 
only upon a showing of good cause therefor, except 
that a statement concerning the action or its subject 
matter previously given by the party seeking the 
statement may be obtained without such a 
showing.202  
This solution was odd in that it seemingly ignored the Supreme 
Court’s statement in Hickman that such materials could only be 
discovered upon a showing of necessity and prejudice.203  
Furthermore, the one-size-fits-all approach to work product 
materials failed to recognize the special protection that the 
Hickman Court recognized should be afforded to an attorney’s 
“core” work product.204  As one critic of the rule recognized, 
 
199Anderson, supra n. 7, at 782-83 (noting that the amendments were rejected). 
200Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure 
Relating to Deposition and Discovery (Nov. 1967), 43 F.R.D. 211, 225 (1968). 
201Id. 
202Id.  It is perhaps worth noting that the 1946 Amendment also contained an 
“anticipation of litigation” requirement, which may have simply been carried 
forward when it became time to amend the Rules.  See part III.C., supra. 
203Hickman, 329 U.S. at 509, 511-12; Address by Fred A. Freund, Changes 
Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 479, 494 (1968). 
204Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511-12. 
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“[t]he source of error . . . is in formulating flexible language to 
cover all such materials, rather than dealing directly and 
specifically with what experience has taught – that certain 
materials deserve more protection than others.”205 
In response to criticisms that the “good cause” standard 
would create confusion based on the various meanings the term 
had been given by courts, the Advisory Committee altered the 
standard in Rule 26(b) to reflect the trend in case law to require 
“more than mere relevance.”206  Thus, in keeping with the factors 
stated in Hickman as to when trial preparation material could be 
discovered, the Committee added that such material could only be 
discovered “upon a showing of substantial need of the materials in 
the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue 
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by 
other means.”207  The Committee also added language to protect 
the “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories 
concerning the litigation of an attorney or other representative of a 
party.”  In doing so, the Committee cited again to Hickman, 
however, the Committee failed to clarify the extent of such 
protection.208  The final language also failed to provide guidance 
as to the meaning of the term “anticipation of litigation.”209  This 
 
205Address by Fred A. Freund, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 
F.R.D. 479, 494 (1968) (emphasis in original). 
206Advisory Committee’s Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments of 
the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 500; Minutes of the July 17-19, 1969 
Meeting of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure p. 3, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutes.htm . 
207Advisory Committee’s Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments of 
the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 494, 501 (1969). 
208It was noted in the meeting minutes of the Standing Committee that a 
question regarding this provision was raised, though it is unclear whether the 
question was with regard to the scope of the protection or some other matter.  
Minutes of the July 17-19, 1969 Meeting of the Standing Committee on Rules 
of Practice and Procedure p. 3, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutes.htm . 
209See FTC v. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 25 (1983) (noting that “Rule 26(b)(3) 
does not address in so many words the temporal scope of the work product 
immunity and a review of the Advisory Committee’s comments reveals no 
express concern for that issue.”). 
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term, as previously discussed, has led to splits among district and 
appellate courts as to its meaning.210  Furthermore, a review of the 
documents explaining the Committee’s reasoning regarding the 
amendments reveals that the work product doctrine was often 
simply assumed to be relevant only when in “anticipation of 
litigation,” but no discussion of the standard or why such a 
limitation should apply also to “core” work product appears.211 
 
B. The Supreme Court’s interpretations of the work 
product doctrine 
 
The Supreme Court has seldom discussed the scope or 
limits of the work product doctrine since passage of amended Rule 
26 other than fleeting mentions of the Rule.  There are, however, 
at least three post-amendment opinions that merit discussion: 
United States v. Nobles,212 FTC v. Grolier, Inc.,213 and Upjohn Co. 
v. United States.214  The first two add some insight into the Court’s 
 
210See part II.A.1., supra. 
211See, e.g., Advisory Committee’s Explanatory Statement Concerning 
Amendments of the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 499-500 (noting the major 
difficulties with existing law but omitting any mention of  “core” work 
product); Minutes of the May 20-21, 1966 Meeting of the Advisory Committee 
on Civil pp. 30-31, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutes.htm.  
The following excerpt is an example of the assumption that “core” work 
product is only an issue when litigation is pending: 
Mr. Acheson: I thought Mr. Jenner was merely talking about 
preparation in anticipation of trial and he said a lot of this is 
done before there is any trial at all. 
Mr. Jenner: Yes, there would be no counsel at that particular 
point. 
Id. (emphasis added).  See also Minutes of the July 17-19, 1969 Meeting of the 
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure p. 3, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutes.htm; Minutes of the March 9-10, 1967 
Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil pp. 6-7, 11-12, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutes.htm.   
212422 U.S. 225 (1975). 
213462 U.S. 19 (1983). 
214449 U.S. 383 (1981).  Professor Roger Kirst also discusses these three cases 
in his article which advocates for expanded protection for the work of the 
transactional attorney.  See Kirst, supra n.66, at 268-73. 
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view of the doctrine, however it is the Upjohn decision that is the 
most instructive, both in the language used by the Court and also 
by the way in which it deals with “core” work product. 
In Nobles, a defendant accused of armed robbery sought to 
impeach the prosecution’s two key eye-witnesses through 
statements they had previously made to a defense investigator.215 
The statements were written down by the investigator and made 
part of a written report.216  The prosecution sought to inspect the 
report and the court denied the request.217  However, the court told 
defense counsel that if the investigator were called to the stand to 
testify by the defense, the court would order production of those 
portions of the report relevant to the impeachment.218  Defense 
counsel later did seek to call the investigator for purposes of 
impeachment but refused to share the report and so the court ruled 
that the investigator could not testify.219  The Ninth Circuit 
reversed finding that compelling discovery of the report violated 
both the Fifth Amendment as well as Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 16 (the criminal analog to the Federal Rule 26(b)).220  
The Supreme Court reversed finding that neither the Fifth 
Amendment nor Rule 16 were implicated.221  The Court 
considered implication of the work product doctrine under 
Hickman separately from Rule 16 and held that the defendant had 
waived its protection when he sought to introduce the testimony of 
the investigator.222 
The Court’s discussion of the work product doctrine, at 
first glance, appears rather unremarkable as far as its impact on 
civil litigation.  However, there are at least two interesting aspects 
of the opinion that are worth discussing.  First, the Court felt 
compelled to discuss the work product doctrine under Hickman 
separate from application of Rule 16, thus recognizing that 
 
215United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 222, 227 (1975). 
216Id. at 227-28. 
217Id. at 228-29. 
218Id. at 229 and n.3. 
219Id. at 229. 
220Id. at 229-30. 
221Id. at 234-35. 
222Id. at 239-40. 
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Hickman has continued validity apart from the rules.223  Second, 
the Court, in its discussion of Hickman, stated, “The [Hickman] 
Court therefore recognized a qualified privilege for certain 
materials prepared by an attorney ‘acting for his client in 
anticipation of litigation.’”224  Some courts have taken this as an 
endorsement that the work product doctrine only applies to 
materials produced in “anticipation of litigation.”225  The Court’s 
statement makes no such limitation, however, and could be read as 
nothing more than a description of the context in which Hickman 
was decided.226 
The Grolier case involved a request by Grolier Inc. under 
the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) for documents 
generated by the Government during an investigation of a 
subsidiary of Grolier which was subsequently dismissed.227   The 
Commission for disclosure of documents denied the request 
claiming they were exempt under Exemption 5 of FOIA, which 
 
223The Court was compelled to do so as it found that Rule 16 only applied to 
pre-trial discovery but that Hickman applied to both pre-trial discovery and 
discovery after trial has begun.  Id. at 235, 238-39.  This was the subject of 
Justice White’s concurrence, as he took issue limiting a trial court’s discretion 
on evidentiary matter under Hickman.  Id. at 243 (White, J., concurring). 
224Id. at 237-38 (quoting Hickman).  After making this statement, the Court 
makes a string cite to, among other things, the Harvard student note discussed in 
part IV.A., supra.  Id. at 238. 
225See, e.g., In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 61 (7th 
Cir. 1980) (failing to dispel the Government’s assertion that Nobles requires a 
document be prepared in anticipation of litigation for work product protection); 
Matter of Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 212-13 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding, on the work 
product issue, that “[t]he limited work product immunity extends only to certain 
materials prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation” and citing 
generally to Nobles); In re Grand Jury Proceedings of June 16, 1981, 519 F. 
Supp. 791, 793 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (“[T]he work product rule only applies to 
documents prepared in ‘anticipation of litigation,’” citing Nobles, 422 U.S. at 
238).  See also Kirst, supra n. 66, at 272 and n.213.  As Professor Kirst 
correctly notes, these cases add the word “only” which is not found in the 
Nobles statement.  Id. at 272. 
226See Kirst, supra n. 66, at 272 (noting also that the statement was dictum in 
that the Court’s decision rested upon waiver and not whether the report was 
created in anticipation of litigation). 
227F.T.C. v. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 21(1983). 
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protected from disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency 
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a 
party other than an agency in litigation with the agency . . . .”228  
The district court agreed that all of the documents were protected 
under Exemption 5, some of which due to the work product 
doctrine.229  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
reversed finding that the work product doctrine only protected 
documents in an existing or potentially existing related 
litigation.230    Thus, the issue before the Supreme Court was not 
one related to discussing whether “core” work product could be 
protected in a non-litigation context, but rather whether Hickman 
and Rule 26(b) allowed the work product doctrine to extend to 
other subsequent disputes, even if unrelated to the original 
litigation.231  The Court noted the lack of any clear guidance on 
the issue of a temporal scope for the work product rule, but did 
express its view that “the literal language of the Rule protects 
materials prepared for any litigation or trial as long as they were 
prepared by or for a party to the subsequent litigation.”232  Thus, 
the Court would seem to have expanded the protection of the Rule, 
but the authority of this precedent was weakened by the Court’s 
decision to base its ruling on an independent construction of 
Exemption 5 to FOIA.233  Though there is some inkling that the 
Court favored a broader rather than narrower view of the work 
product doctrine, the Grolier case does not answer the question of 
whether “core” work product can enjoy protection when not 
generated in “anticipation of litigation.” 
The most instructive Supreme Court opinion to be issued 
since the adoption of the 1970 amendment to Rule 26 is the 
Upjohn opinion.  Though Upjohn Company v. United States234 is 
most often known for the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
 
228Id. at 22, n.3 (citing 5 U.S.C.§ 522(b)(5)). 
229Id. 
230Id. at 23. 
231Id. at 24-25. 
232Id. at 25. 
233Id. at 26; Kirst, supra n.66, at 272-73. 
234
 449 U.S. 283 (1981). 
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scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context,235 
the decision also is relevant in interpreting the work product 
doctrine.236  In Upjohn, the petitioner, Upjohn Company, 
maintained that questionnaires sent by its attorneys to Upjohn 
employees were privileged.237  The questionnaires were part of an 
internal investigation that began in January of 1976 to discover 
whether subsidiaries had made payments directly to or to the 
benefit of foreign government officials in order to secure 
government business.238  Upjohn’s attorneys also interviewed the 
recipients of the questionnaire and 33 other Upjohn officers or 
employees as part of the investigation.239  The interview notes 
were described by Upjohn’s in-house counsel as follows: 
My notes would contain what I considered to be the 
important questions, the substance of the responses 
to them, my beliefs as to the importance of these, 
my beliefs as to how they related to the inquiry, my 
thoughts as to how they related to other questions. 
In some instances they might even suggest other 
questions that I would have to ask or things that I 
needed to find elsewhere. They were more than just 
a verbatim report of my conversation with the-a 
report of my conversation in the interviews.240 
In March of 1976, after the initial investigation was made, 
Upjohn made a preliminary report to the Securities and Exchange 
 
235
 Id. at 386;  Anthony B. Joyce, The Massachsetts Approach to the 
Intersection of Governmental Attorney-Client Privilege and Open Government 
Laws, 42 SUFFOLK L. REV. 957, n. 5 (2009); Marks, supra n.47, at 162; The 
ABA Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege, Report of the American Bar 
Association’s Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 60 BUS. LAW 1029, 
1035 (2005). 
236See Kirst, supra n.66, at 268-71 (discussing the relevance of Upjohn to the 
work product doctrine). 
237
 Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386-87(1981). 
238
 Id. at 386. 
239
 Id. at 387. 
240Upjohn v. United States, 1978 WL 1163, *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 23, 1978).  It 
should be noted that the in-house general counsel was also the vice president 
and secretary of the company as well as a member of the board of directors.  Id. 
at *2. 
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Commission (“SEC”) on its Form 8-K disclosing that Upjohn had 
made questionable payments.241  Subsequently, the IRS issued a 
summons demanding production of these materials.242  Upjohn 
declined to produce the documents on the grounds that they were 
protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and also 
constituted the work product of an attorney prepared in 
“anticipation of litigation.”243  The United States filed a petition to 
enforce the summons in the Western District of Michigan, and 
upon the recommendation of the Magistrate, the court ordered the 
production of the disputed materials.244  With regard to the claims 
of work product protection, the Magistrate expressed some doubt 
as to whether the work product doctrine applied at all to a tax 
summons, but even if it did, found that the Government had met 
its burden of proving “substantial need” and an inability “without 
undue hardship” to obtain the information by other means.245  The 
Sixth Circuit upheld the Magistrate’s ruling with regard to the 
work product doctrine, stating, in a footnote, that the work product 
doctrine did not apply to an IRS summons and made no further 
analysis on the topic.246   
On appeal, the Supreme Court quickly dismissed the Sixth 
Circuit’s notion that the work product doctrine did not apply to a 
tax summons.247  As the Magistrate had premised his ruling on a 
finding of “substantial need” and “undue hardship,” the Court 
continued its analysis, citing to both Rule 26 and Hickman.248  The 
Court began its analysis by quoting Hickman’s policy reasons for 
establishing the work product doctrine, citing both the “zone of 
privacy” language as well as the language deriding the effect 
disclosure would have on the profession and the relationship with 
 
241Id.; Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386-87. 
242
 Id. at 387-88. 
243
 Id. at 388.  
244
 Id. at 387.  The magistrate also concluded that Upjohn had waived the 
attorney-client privilege, but the Sixth Circuit rejected this finding.  Id. 
245Upjohn, 1978 WL 1163, at *11-13. 
246Upjohn v. United States, 600 F.2d  1223, 1227-28, n.13 (6th Cir. 1979). 
247Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981). 
248Id. at 398-99. 
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clients.249  It then rejected the Government’s argument that, even 
under Hickman, necessity could compel disclosure of “core” work 
product.  The Court did so by distinguishing between “ordinary” 
work product and “core” work product, noting that the caveat to 
disclosure in Hickman, “did not apply to ‘oral statements made by 
witnesses ... whether presently in the form of [the attorney's] 
mental impressions or memoranda.’”250  The Court recognized that 
some courts, applying Hickman and Rule 26, had afforded 
absolute immunity to such materials, a standard the Court was 
unwilling to adopt or reject because it was sufficient to merely 
remand on the basis that the Magistrate had applied the wrong 
standard in requiring “substantial need” and “undue hardship.”251 
The Upjohn opinion is instructive both for its semantics 
and for how it treated the “core” work product at issue.  
Semantically, it is instructive that the Court cited to both the 
Hickman opinion as well as Rule 26 in explaining the work 
product doctrine.252  The court also noted that Hickman’s policies 
had been “substantially incorporated” into Rule 26; a recognition 
that Hickman was not fully incorporated into the Rule.253  Indeed, 
this is consistent with the view that Hickman does continue to 
have validity in covering intangible work product , while Rule 26, 
by its terms, only applies to tangible work product.254  It is also 
worth noting that, in articulating the policies supporting the work 
product doctrine, the court did not stop with the “zone of privacy” 
justification that is commonly cited, but also went on to articulate 
 
249Id. at 397-98. 
250Id. at 399 (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 512). 
251Id. at 401-02. 
252Id. at 397-399. 
253Id. at 398; Kirst, supra n. 66, at 233. 
254In re Cedant Corp. Securities Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 2003); 
Whitlow v. Martin, 2009 WL 2241152 at *3 (Fed. Cl. 2009); Abdell v. City of 
New York, 2006 WL 2664313 at *3 (S.D. N.Y. 2006); Am. Fed. Bank v. 
United States, 60 Fed.Cl. 493, 497 (Fed. Cl. 2003); Epstein, supra n.8, at 815; 
Marcus, supra n.11, at 349-50; WRIGHT ET AL., supra n.11, § 2024; Charles P. 
Cercone, The War Against Work Product Abuse: Exposing the Legal Alchemy 
of Document Compilations as Work Product, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 639, 658 
(2003). 
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the beneficial effect the doctrine would have on the legal 
profession and the attorney-client relationship.  Finally, the 
Court’s distinction of how “ordinary” work product prepared 
“with an eye toward litigation” is to be treated differently from 
“core” work product emphasizes the special protection the Court 
felt core work product should receive.255 
With regard to this last point, the Upjohn opinion is as 
insightful for what it does not say as for what it does; namely, the 
complete lack of discussion of whether the work product at issue 
was prepared in “anticipation of litigation.”  Consider the time 
period during which the interview notes were created – from 
January 1976 to March 1976.  This was prior to Upjohn reporting 
to the SEC or IRS and was merely part of the company’s own 
internal investigation.256  In other contexts, lower courts have 
found such material to be beyond the protection of the work 
product doctrine because it was not prepared “in anticipation of 
litigation.”257  Yet the Supreme Court did not discuss this as a 
requirement in its analysis but instead, moved forward on the 
assumption that the material in question was “work product.”  It 
may be that this omission is simply because the issue was not 
raised by the parties nor addressed by the Magistrate.  But given 
the timeline of events, it seems odd that the Court would remand 
when it could have just as easily upheld the Magistrate’s ruling on 
the ground that the “core” work product at issue was still subject 
to the “anticipation of litigation” requirement.  Perhaps what can 
be taken from this is that the Supreme Court was not terribly 
 
255Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399 (1981). 
256See Leslie Wharton et al., 2 Successful Partnering Between Inside and 
Outside Counsel §33:32 (“The work product at issue had been created long 
before the contested tax summons was issued, and even before Upjohn had filed 
the report with the government that instigated the IRS's investigation.”). 
257See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. at 156; Guzzino, 174 F.R.D. at 
63; Epstein, supra n.8, at 831 (citing same).  See also Smith, supra n.64, at 35 
(“Because the work product doctrine is narrower in scope than the attorney-
client privilege in that it only applies when litigation is ongoing or pending, an 
entity must next determine whether the investigation is being conducted as a 
result of pending litigation.”); Imperato, supra n.64, at 216 (“The key to this 
protection is that the work must be performed in anticipation of litigation.”). 
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concerned with the temporal scope of the doctrine, at least where 
“core” work product was at issue.258 
 
IV.The anticipation misconception 
 
After reviewing opinions subsequent to Hickman as well as 
the discussions regarding the formulation of Rule 26(b), it is clear 
that a number of courts and commentators have assumed that 
Hickman intended work product protection to apply only to 
material generated in “anticipation of litigation.”  However, as has 
been shown, a careful review of Hickman reveals no such 
requirement.  Indeed, quite to the contrary, the Court’s discussion 
of core work product as well as the policy discussion justifying the 
doctrine would seem to indicate that protection should be afforded 
to core work product, regardless of any temporal or motivational 
link to litigation.  Indeed, much of the confusion surrounding this 
issue seems to stem from the Developments Note, which offered 
scant support for its conclusion.  Thus it could be said that courts 
 
258The Supreme Court may soon have a chance to clarify this portion of its 
ruling.  In United States v. Textron, Inc., a very recent case decided by an en 
banc panel of the First Circuit, the court held that “tax accrual work papers” 
prepared by Textron’s lawyers and others within Textron’s tax department, 
were not protected by the work product doctrine.  United States v. Textron, Inc., 
577 F.3d 21, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2009)(en banc).  The “tax accrual work papers” at 
issue were created to help Textron create a tax reserve from which to draw 
money should some of its positions on its tax liability be incorrect.  Id. at 23.  
The court recognized that such papers could reveal the “soft spots” on Textron’s 
tax return should the tax return be litigated.  Id. at 23 (quoting United States v. 
Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 813 (1984)).  However, looking to the 
motivational component of the “anticipation of litigation” requirement, the 
court held that the creation of the work papers was motivated by financial and 
business concerns rather for use in future litigation.  Id. at 27-28.  As of this 
writing, Textron has filed a Motion to Stay the Mandate Pending the Filing of a 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, meaning this issue could be before the Supreme 
Court in the near future.  See Textron, Inc.’s Motion to Stay the Mandate 
Pending the Filing of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, filed August 21, 2009 
(on file with author).  For an excellent review of the Textron district court 
opinion, see generally Claudine Pease-Wingenter, The Application of the 
Attorney-Client Privilege to Tax Accrual Workpapers: The Real Legacy of 
United States v. Textron, 8 HOUSTON BUS. & TAX L.J. 337 (2008). 
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and commentators alike have been operating under an anticipation 
misconception in that they have viewed the “anticipation of 
litigation” standard as a bar to protection of “core” work product 
that does not meet this requirement. 
This misconception may be understandable when the role 
of the lawyer is viewed historically.  At the time of the Hickman 
decision, in-house counsel only made up roughly 3 percent of all 
attorneys and the work performed by these attorneys was rather 
routine.259  Litigation and trial work were more heavily associated 
with the work of an attorney than transactional or prophylactic 
legal work.260  Indeed, up until the mid-1800s the attorney-client 
privilege was also limited to trial work.261  Though the number of 
in-house counsel had grown to 10.3 percent by 1970,262 by then 
“anticipation of litigation” as a requirement had already taken 
hold.  However, today the role of the attorney is understood to 
expand beyond just trial work into complex transactional work 
which may, or may not ultimately require litigation. 
A second, related misconception is also worth noting with 
regard to Hickman.  It is often written that the policy justification 
for the work product doctrine is that the attorney requires a “zone 
of privacy” within which to work.263  This justification is a nod to 
 
259THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 500, 505 (Kermit L. Hall, et al. 
eds., Oxford 2002) (noting that “[i]n 1948, only 3 percent of all lawyers were 
employed in private industry” and the role of the attorney, up until the 1960s, 
was traditionally to handle routine legal issues while leaving more complex 
legal issues for outside counsel). 
260See id. at 500 (“Corporate counsel traditionally acted as business counselors 
and advisors to their employers concerning routine legal issues; more complex 
legal issues were handled by the corporation’s outside counsel.”). 
261See note 57, supra. 
262Vern Countryman et al., THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY 4 (2d ed., Little 
Brown and Co. 1976).  This growth appears to have been a steady incline 
growing from 5.5 percent in 1951 to 8.9 percent in 1960.  Id. 
263See, e.g., Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. United States, 69 Fed.Cl. 784, 789 
(Fed. Cl. 2006) (asserting that the work product doctrine is intended to preserve 
a zone of privacy where an attorney can prepare and develop his legal strategy); 
Hobley v. Burge, 433 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 2006) (identifying the purpose of 
the work product doctrine as establishing a zone of privacy in which lawyers 
can analyze their case free from interference by an adversary); Hanson v. U.S. 
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the benefits that are viewed to result in a robust adversarial 
system.  However, to cite only to this adversarial justification 
ignores the Hickman Court’s further statements with regards to the 
detrimental effect disclosure of work product materials would 
have on the legal profession as well as the attorney-client 
relationship.264  In this regard, the work product doctrine’s 
justification bears much in common with the instrumental 
justification that is the foundation of the attorney-client privilege, 
which is not tied to any litigation requirement.265  Indeed, even the 
cost-free nature of the privilege could be found to apply to the 
work product doctrine; instead of communications not existing 
absent the privilege, the cost free nature is found in the Supreme 
Court’s statement that “much of what is now put down in writing 
would remain unwritten.”266 
 
A.Correcting the anticipation misconception 
 
In light of these misconceptions, a simple fix is possible: 
eliminating the “anticipation of litigation” requirement for “core” 
work product.  This could be accomplished by simply extending 
Hickman, which already continues to have validity today despite 
Rule 26(b), and recognizing that “core” work product continues to 
retain a residuum of protection even outside of the litigation 
context.267  This would require a complete elimination of the 
temporal analysis and a modification of the motivational analysis.  
Instead of looking to whether the motivation for creating the work 
product is litigation, the test should be whether the work product 
sought was generated by the attorney to provide legal assistance.  
 
Agency for Intern. Development, 372 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2004) (indicating 
that the work product doctrine serves to provide a zone of privacy within which 
to plan for a case); United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 
1998) (stating the purpose of the work product doctrine is to preserve a zone of 
privacy in which an attorney can prepare their case). 
264Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-13. 
265See Part II.B.2 supra. 
266Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. 
267Epstein, supra n.8, at 815; Marcus, supra n. 11, at 349-50; Cercone, supra 
n.254, at 658; WRIGHT ET AL., supra n. 11, § 2024. 
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This admittedly would mimic the test for whether a 
communication is protected under the attorney-client privilege,268 
but given the similar purposes of the doctrines, this is a logical 
test.  Though this may seem like a rather drastic proposal, a similar 
expansion already exists under California state law269 and at least 
one commentator has advocated for recognition of such an 
expansion to protect the work of transactional attorneys.270 
Such recognition of a residuum of protection would be in 
line with the policy justifications of Hickman on both instrumental 
and adversarial policy grounds.  With regard to the instrumental 
justification, as to “core” or “opinion” work product, if the 
justifications for granting a qualified privilege within the litigation 
context holds true, then those justifications should apply equally to 
such materials outside the litigation context as well.  As the 
Supreme Court noted in Hickman, there could be a chilling effect 
on the attorney-client relationship and “much of what is now put 
 
268See Kramer v. Raymond Corp., 1992 WL 122856 at * 1 (E.D. Pa. 1992); 
MSF Holding, Ltd. v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int’l, 2005 WL 3338510 at *1 (S.D. 
N.Y. 2005); Avianca, 705 F.Supp. at 676. Epstein, supra n.8, at 815; Marcus, 
supra n.11, at 349-50; WRIGHT ET AL., supra n.11, § 2024; Cercone, supra 
n.254, at 658. 
269Calif. Code of Civil Procedure § 2018.030(a) (West 2005) (“A writing that 
reflects an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or 
theories is not discoverable under any circumstances.”); County of Los Angeles 
v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 574 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2000) (interpreting California’s work product rule); Wellpoint Health 
Networks, Inc. v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 59 Cal.App.4th 
110, 120 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Rumac, Inc. v. Bottomley, 143 Cal.App.3d 810, 
815 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (contrasting the California rule with the Federal Rule). 
270See Kirst, supra n.66, at 230-35.  Though Professor Kirst’s article is equally 
critical of the “anticipation of litigation” requirement, and shares a similar line 
of reasoning as to its analysis of Hickman and Upjohn, the Kirst article focuses 
much more on a recognition of a transactional privilege based on a more 
extensive review of the attorney-client privilege.  This article does not limit the 
scope of protection to a transactional privilege and is based more on the 
historical and philosophical development of the work product doctrine.  For a 
contrary view of the work product doctrine, see Elizabeth G. Thornburg, 
Rethinking Work Product, 77 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1517 (1991), in which 
Thornburg argues that the work product doctrine should be eliminated entirely. 
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down in writing would remain unwritten.”271  Yet clients come to 
attorneys for help both inside and outside of the litigation context 
and the lawyer’s role outside of the litigation context is no less 
important.  As one California Appellate Court articulated in 
explaining its legislature’s own decision to expand the scope of 
coverage: 
[P]rotecting attorneys' work product when they act 
in a nonlitigation legal capacity furthers the 
important goal of reducing the likelihood of 
litigation. Although all litigators are attorneys, the 
converse is not true. Nevertheless, “[t]he lawyer, 
when acting as a counselor, performs a function 
that is extremely beneficial to society, in that 
effective legal counseling minimizes the likelihood 
of conflict between parties by stabilizing 
relationships and promoting understanding and 
cooperation. Effective legal counselors provide the 
'solvents and lubricants which reduce the frictions 
of our complex society.' In the role of counselor, 
the lawyer serves as an instrument of peace.”272 
To limit the protection of core work product to only the litigation 
context ignores this important policy justification for the rule as 
enunciated in Hickman. 273 
The expansion is also in line with the adversarial 
justification given in Hickman.  The “zone of privacy,” which 
 
271Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. 
272Rumac, Inc., 143 Cal. App.3d at 816 (quoting Edward D. Re, The Lawyer as 
Counselor and the Prevention of Litigation, 31 CATH. U.L.REV. 685, 690-691 
(1982)).  See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH 
CENTURY 461 (Yale Univ. Press 2002) (“Lawyers, in the main, service 
business.  They help form corporations, they advise on corporate affairs, they 
maneuver through tangles of red tape; they cope with federal, state, and local 
government; they help put deals together.”). 
273This instrumental justification is important as it continues to have validity, at 
least in the Supreme Court’s view, in modern times.  United States v. Zolin, 491 
U.S. 554, 562-63 (1989); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1996); 
Swindler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408 (1998); IMWINKELRIED, 
supra n.55, at 258-59 (citing Zolin, Jafee, and Swindler & Berlin). 
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recognized that attorneys must work without fear that the 
opponent would gain important insight into his or her strategy 
decisions is applicable even at stages when litigation is only a 
remote possibility.  Indeed, the “core” work product of an attorney 
who is engaged to avoid litigation, even at an early stage when no 
litigation is on the horizon, can still give helpful insight into how a 
party will prepare its case or give helpful insight into the strategy 
that will be used at trial.  The following example is illuminating: 
For instance, an attorney who prepares a 
memorandum on the strengths and weaknesses of a 
contract he has drawn up for a client might modify 
his handling of future memoranda if he knew such 
documents were routinely discoverable. The 
memorandum, if discovered, could provide some 
unforeseen adversary with insights into weaknesses 
that he had not detected on his own.274 
A recognition that a residuum of protection remains under 
Hickman would help alleviate this concern. 
 
B.Justifications for retaining the “anticipation” requirement 
 
Despite the strengths of the arguments in favor of 
recognition of expansion of the coverage of work product 
protection, there are a number of countervailing arguments that 
should be addressed.  The first is the argument that an attorney 
working in a non-litigation context will have no fear of discovery 
and thus no chilling effect on his work product would occur.  This 
was the reasoning put forth in the previously discussed 
Developments Note that appears to have helped establish the 
“anticipation of litigation” requirement.  As has already been 
explained, the Developments Note’s reasoning seems naïve at 
 
274Anderson, supra n.7, at 788, n.175.  The footnote prefaces that “[a]lthough 
rule 26(b)(3) focuses on litigation, there is no reason to believe that the 
Hickman rationale is so limited. Arguably, the courts should protect a broader 
range of attorney work product.”  Id.  The footnote concludes, however, that  
protection could be available through the attorney-client privilege or a 
protective order.  Id. 
COLIN P. MARKS – THE ANTICIPATION  MISCONCEPTION 3/10/2010  11:52:04 AM 
 
64 
 
best, particularly in light of modern legal practices.  Attorneys 
engaged in any arena of modern day transactional work, such as 
negotiating and reviewing contracts, drafting wills, administering 
tax advice or working on patent prosecution, are aware that 
litigation may ensue.  Indeed, given the relative permanence an 
attorney’s work has thanks to electronic storage, in modern times, 
this justification for retaining the requirement as to “core” work 
product has little bite.  
Another, more compelling argument against removing the 
requirement is that it cuts against the purposes of the Rules.  The 
original Rules were enacted to open discovery up so that cases 
were won or lost based on justice rather than gamesmanship.  To 
cut back on discovery in such a way could open up opportunities 
for abuses by parties and a return to the gamesmanship that 
marked the pre-Rules era.  This argument would be more 
persuasive if what was being proposed was a complete 
abandonment of the “anticipation of litigation” requirement.  The 
expansion argued for is only with regard to the “core” work 
product of the attorney.  The “anticipation of litigation” 
requirement makes sense as to “ordinary” work product and is in 
line with the balance struck as to the adversarial nature of the work 
product exception.  Placing a burden for discovery of such 
materials on a party seeking “ordinary” work product outside of 
the litigation context would be overly burdensome and potentially 
could heighten the gamesmanship that was inherent in the system 
prior to enactment of the Rules.  However, as to “core” or 
“opinion” work product, if the justifications for granting a 
qualified privilege articulated in Hickman are to be believed, then 
the benefits of protection outweigh the negative effects feared.275 
 
275Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-13.  It should be noted that even under such an 
expansion of the work product doctrine, the exceptions of waiver and the crime-
fraud exception could still apply, further limiting the perceived damaging 
effects such protection would have on an open discovery system.  Contrast 
Wellpoint, 59 Cal.App.4th at 120 (citing BP Alaska Exploration, Inc. v. 
Superior Court, 199 Cal.App.3d 1240, 1249 (Cal. App. Ct. 1988) and noting 
that, under California law, though waiver applied to the work product rule, the 
crime-fraud exception did not). 
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This leads, however, to possibly the strongest argument 
against such a change.  If the expansion of the work product 
doctrine is to rely upon the instrumental policy justification that is 
shared with the attorney-client privilege, then it must also suffer 
from the weakness of this justification, i.e. that the perceived 
benefits of the protection are speculative at best.  Indeed, the work 
product doctrine may be more susceptible to such an attack in light 
of how long we have lived without such an expansion.  It is 
difficult to say that much of what is written down would not be, 
and that the expansion is necessary to avoid a detrimental effect on 
the attorney client relationship when no such expanded protection 
has been afforded to core work product for approximately the last 
80 years.276 
To this there are a number of responses that can be offered.  
First, though the instrumental justification is one justification for 
 
276A corollary to this argument would be that protective orders are available 
under Rule 26(c) to protect work product that is not covered under (b).  See Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 26(c).  Cf. Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client 
Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191, 408 (1989) 
(“If a claim of corporate privilege is overridden because of the particular 
evidentiary needs of the litigants, the court should be receptive to the 
corporation's request for a protective order to minimize the risk of dissemination 
of the attorney-client communications to the public or to parties in other 
proceedings.”).  However, as has already been demonstrated, despite the 
availability of such a measure, problems have persisted as to the discovery of 
“core” work product.  Indeed, the Rule itself speaks in terms that do no not lend 
the reader to think that simply by virtue of having “core” work product status, 
that protection should be granted as it states, “[a] party or any person from 
whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order in the court where 
the action is pending . . .. The court may, for good cause, issue an order to 
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 
burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (A) forbidding the 
disclosure or discovery . . ..”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (emphasis added).  Also, the 
presence of a “good cause” justification is problematic as this was the precise 
language that was rejected by the Advisory Committee as being unacceptable 
with regard to protecting work product due to confusion as to its meaning.  See 
part III.C., supra.  In fact, a court could simply return to the “anticipation of 
litigation” analysis to determine if a protective order was justified.  See, e.g., In 
re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. at 133 (denying request for protective 
order as the material at issue was not produced in anticipation of litigation). 
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expansion of the doctrine, it is not the only one.  The expansion of 
the doctrine is also in line with the adversarial justification 
articulated in Hickman as has been noted above.  Indeed, it is 
interesting to note that though the attorney-client privilege has 
long stood upon the speculative instrumental justification, one of 
the primary alternative justifications that has been offered up for 
its continued existence is a humanistic privacy justification, which 
would seem to mirror the adversarial justification given for the 
work product doctrine.277 
Furthermore, while there has been no protection for such 
materials in the past, today’s legal environment is much different 
from the one in which Hickman was decided, or the one in which 
the current version of Rule 26(b) was effected, or even the legal 
environment of ten years ago.  This is due to both the growth of 
legal profession as a whole and in the in-house sector, as well as 
the advent of electronic discovery.  In 1948, the time Hickman was 
decided and when the Rules were under consideration for 
amendment, in-house counsel accounted for 3 percent of all 
attorneys,278 of which there were approximately 200,000 (placing 
the number of in-house at approximately 6,000).279  The work of 
these in-house attorneys was relatively routine, but through the 
years grew to encompass increasingly complex matters.280  By 
1970, the year in which the work product doctrine became a part 
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the total number of attorneys had 
grown to 355,242 of which 11 percent worked in-house (placing 
the number of in-house counsel at approximately 39,076) .281  This 
 
277See notes 166-173, supra and accompanying text. 
278THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 500, 504-505 (Kermit L. Hall, 
et al. eds., Oxford 2002). 
279See GLENN GREENWOOD, THE 1961 LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 88 
(American Bar Foundation 1962) (placing the total number of attorneys in the 
U.S. in 1951 at 221,605). 
280THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 500, 505 (Kermit L. Hall, et al. 
eds., Oxford 2002); VERN COUNTRYMAN, ET AL, THE LAWYER IN MODERN 
SOCIETY 41, 44 (Little, Brown and Co. 1976). 
281BARBARA A. CURAN ET AL., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: A 
STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980S 12 
(American Bar Foundation 1985); VERN COUNTRYMAN, ET AL, THE LAWYER IN 
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percentage leveled out over the next few decades, with in-house 
representing 10 percent of the total number of attorneys in 1980, 
of which there were 542,205 (placing the number of in-house at 
approximately 54,000),282 8 percent in 1995 (with a total number 
of approximately 71,349 in-house)283 and 8.4 percent in 2000 (for 
a total number of in-house counsel of 75,954).284  In 2008, the 
total number of attorneys in the U.S. had reached 1,014,000 and 
though no percentage of in-house counsel number appears 
available yet, if the percentage remains in the 8-10 percent range, 
this would place the number of in-house counsel somewhere 
between 81,120 and 101,400.  Even going by a conservative 
estimate, this growth represents a significant increase in the raw 
numbers from 1948, and over a doubling of the number of in-
house counsel since 1970.  When the advent of e-discovery is 
coupled with this growth in the numbers and use of in-house 
counsel, there is a great likelihood that, as a practical matter, 
materials exist today that simply would not have been discovered 
at the time of Hickman.   
The advent and regular use of computers and electronic 
storage of materials has created an environment in which every 
key stroke is recorded and recoverable.  Notes, drafts and other 
material, which may very well have disappeared in hard copy, 
particularly after a few years, either through a document 
destruction program or simply by accident (we all know how 
unorganized some attorneys can be), are now discoverable through 
e-discovery measures. This has led to a large increase in the 
amount of discoverable information.285  It has also led to an 
 
MODERN SOCIETY 4 (Little, Brown and Co. 1976) (placing the percentage at 
10.3 percent). 
282CURAN, supra n.281, at 12; FRIEDMAN, supra n.272, at 461. 
283CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL 
PROFESSION IN 1995 7 (American Bar Foundation 1999). 
284CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL 
PROFESSION IN 2000 28 (American Bar Foundation 2004).  The total number of 
attorneys in the U.S. had grown to over 1 million. Id. at 27. 
285Tracey L. Boyd, The Information Black Hole: Managing the Issues Arising 
from the Increase in Electronic Data Discovery in Litigation, 7 VAND. J. ENT. 
L. & PRAC. 323, 323-25 (2005) (“Without question, the amount of 
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increase in the ability to easily search through the vast amount of 
information to discover previously difficult to locate documents 
and information.286  As one commentator as characterized it, “[t]he 
data mountain is no longer an impossible height to scale, but a vast 
database to be mined for secrets and insights that were previously 
unavailable.”287  Based on the above, there are two significant 
changes that have occurred since Hickman; first is the increase in 
proportion and sheer number of lawyers used in-house (and for 
increasingly complex matters).  Second, though the proportion of 
attorneys may have steadied by the time the work-product doctrine 
was recognized in Rule 26(b), the nature of discovery has changed 
dramatically since that time.  Thus, if discovery of “core” work 
product was not a concern as a practical matter at the time of 
Hickman or in 1970, the same certainly cannot be said today.288 
 
[electronically] discoverable information greatly exceeds the quantity that is 
available through traditional discovery.”); Steven C. Bennett & Thomas M. 
Niccum, Two Views From the Data Mountain, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 607, 607-
08 (2003); Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in 
Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 up to the Task? 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 349 
(2000). 
286Bennett, supra n.272, at 610-11. 
287Id. 
288For example, a review of the number of ALI/ABA published CLEs regarding 
discovery reveals a substantial increase since 1988, with the largest increase 
coming since 2004.  See www.westlaw.com (search “American Law Institute-
American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education (ALI-ABA)” database 
by inputting “ti(Discovery) & da(1988)” to find the number of ALI/ABA 
articles with the word “discovery” in the title; repeat for every year up to 2009).  
As the chart below demonstrates, the results of this search show that the number 
of articles with “discovery” in the title greatly increased starting in 2004; 
illustrating that more emphasis is being put on issues of discovery in the legal 
community.  This increase may very well be related to the 2006 amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure involving electronic discovery, which were 
being discussed prior to their effective date.  Indeed, a review of the titles from 
2004 onward reveals that a number of the CLEs included the words “electronic” 
or “e-discovery” in their title. 
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Finally, though it can be argued that the benefit is 
speculative, there is evidence, both anecdotally and by analogy to 
studies done in the attorney-client privilege context that would 
suggest otherwise.  Anecdotally, it is not difficult to find attorneys 
with war stories about discovery battles and guarding against what 
was said or written down to avoid a paper trail that could be 
discovered later by an adversary.289  Empirically, there is some 
support that the attorney-client privilege provides more than 
“speculative” benefits.  In 2005, the Association of Corporate 
Counsel (“ACC”) conducted a survey of its members to determine 
whether the attorney-client privilege was under attack by 
governmental agencies.290  Of the 363 respondents to the ACC 
 
 
 
289Cf. JOHN W. GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE 7-10 (2d 
ed. Garland Law Publ’g 1990) (noting that without the protection, in the 
litigation context, counsel would “be forced to balance the benefit of creating 
work product with the risk that his adversary can readily obtain it”). 
290Association of Corporate Counsel Executive Summary, Association of 
Corporate Counsel: Is the Attorney-Client Privilege Under Attack?, at 1 (Apr. 
6, 2005), available at http://www.acca.com/Surveys/attyclient.pdf.  
Additionally, in his 1989 survery concerning the effects, if any, of the attorney 
client privilege, Professor Vincent Alexander found that with respect to 
corporate representatives, 62% of in-house counsel, 88.5% of outside counsel, 
and 75% of executives said that in their opinion the attorney-client privilege 
encourages candor.  Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client 
Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191, 246, 261 
(1989).  While this survey is twenty years old, and therefore not necessarily a 
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survey, 93% believed that senior-level employees of corporate 
clients were aware of the attorney-client privilege and relied upon 
it when consulting corporate counsel.291  This number dropped to 
68% for mid and lower-tier employees.292  Significantly, however, 
95% of the respondents believed that absent the attorney-client 
privilege, there would be a chilling effect of the flow of 
information from clients.293  The National Association of Defense 
Counsel conducted a similar study around the same time period 
which similarly found that 95% of its respondents felt that if the 
attorney-client privilege did not protect its communications or 
work product, there would be a chilling effect on the candid flow 
of information.294  Furthermore, 94% of respondents believed that 
the privilege enhanced the likelihood that company employees 
would discuss difficult issues of legal compliance with the 
attorney and 97% believed that the privilege enhanced the 
“lawyer’s ability to monitor/enforce/improve compliance 
 
representation of circumstances today, the conclusions it draws, along with the 
conclusions promulgated by the Association of Corporate Counsel in their 2005 
survey, provide a strong basis of support for the contention that the attorney-
client privilege provides more than speculative benefits.  Compare Vincent C. 
Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the 
Participants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191, 414 (1989) (stating that the evidence 
gathered in this study contains more evidence than any other study to date that 
the attorney-client privilege encourages candor in communications between an 
attorney and his client) with Association of Corporate Counsel Executive 
Summary, Association of Corporate Counsel: Is the Attorney-Client Privilege 
Under Attack?, at 2-3 (Apr. 6, 2005), available at 
http://www.acca.com/Surveys/attyclient.pdf (finding, just as Professor 
Alexander did twenty years ago, that a vast majority of attorney’s believe there 
would be a chilling effect on candid communication without the attorney client 
privilege). 
291Association of Corporate Counsel Executive Summary, Association of 
Corporate Counsel: Is the Attorney-Client Privilege Under Attack?, at 2-3 (Apr. 
6, 2005), available at http://www.acca.com/Surveys/attyclient.pdf. 
292Id. 
293Id.  
294Executive Summary, NACDL Survey: The Attorney-Client Privilege is Under 
Attack, at 1-3, available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/freeform/attorneyclient?OpenDocument. 
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initiatives.”295  These surveys, however, were of the attorneys and 
not of clients and could themselves be attacked as speculative (in 
that the attorneys are speculating upon what their clients would or 
would not reveal) and self-serving.296  It may be, on this front, 
until a convincing empirical study is completed, that the benefits 
derived from the attorney-client privilege may have to remain 
“speculative,” but, given the above justifications for expanding the 
coverage as to “core” work product, this flaw should not be fatal.  
This is particularly true given that the attorney-client privilege has 
existed on this same speculative benefit for many decades. 
A final argument that could be made against adoption of 
recognizing a residuum of protection for core work product is that 
it will be subject to abuse – that attorney’s will become mere tools 
by which powerful clients, such as corporations, can protect 
documents from exposure simply by having attorneys work on 
matters, be they related to the attorney’s legal expertise or not.  As 
an initial response, I would again point out that recognizing a 
residuum of protection would not mean an abandonment of 
exceptions to the work product doctrine such as the crime-fraud 
exception or waiver.  A corporation or client that wishes to utilize 
an attorney to commit a fraud would still be subject to producing 
the resultant work product.  Furthermore, just as is true with the 
attorney-client privilege, simply using an attorney would not lead 
to protection under the work product doctrine.  The work would 
still need to be generated by the attorney to provide legal 
assistance (and would still be a qualified privilege).  Thus, 
involving an attorney in routine business matters would not lead to 
protection.  While it is true that recognition of a residuum of 
protection could lead to expanded protection of certain documents, 
this proposal is by no means intended to completely displace the 
 
295Association of Corporate Counsel Executive Summary, Association of 
Corporate Counsel: Is the Attorney-Client Privilege Under Attack?, at 4 (Apr. 
6, 2005) available at http://www.acca.com/Surveys/attyclient.pdf. 
296This possibility was recognized by Professor Vincent in his 1989 survey in 
which he noted that the “bias of the participants must be taken into account in 
weighing the accuracy of the results. . . .One may reasonably suspect . . . that 
the role of the privilege as an incentive to candor was exaggerated by the 
participants.”  Vincent, supra n.57, at 263. 
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balance struck with a system of open discovery.  Instead, 
recognition of a residuum of protection would strike a proper 
balance, within the dictates of the Hickman decision, between 
having a system of open discovery and retaining a level of 
protection for documents under both a humanistic privacy 
justification and also an instrumental justification.  And while 
some may take issue with such an expansion and re-balancing, 
citing the need for more rather than less discovery, many of the 
criticisms that could be levied against such an approach could 
easily be levied against the Hickman decision itself.  However, as 
valid as such criticisms may be, the battle to do away with any 
level of protection for work product has been fought and lost long 
ago.  Recognition of a residuum of protection would merely do 
away with the arbitrary lines that are currently being drawn 
regarding “anticipation of litigation.” 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The anticipation misconception has lingered for far too long.  
Rather than attempt to stretch the existing attorney-client privilege 
to include “core” work product or broaden “anticipation of 
litigation” to encompass any work created by the attorney, 
however speculative the litigation may be, a sounder approach 
would be to simply recognize that a residuum of protection exists 
under Hickman that provides a separate protection for “core” work 
product.  This is possible through the original Hickman decision 
itself, which even today has validity despite the existence of Rule 
26(b).  A recognition that “core” work product is protected, even if 
that protection is not absolute, despite the absence of potential 
litigation, is more in line with the duel policy justifications 
articulated by the Court in Hickman.  The first of these policy 
justifications, to promote the adversarial system by providing a 
“zone of privacy,” is advanced by a rule that protects “core” work 
product as, even when litigation may be remote, the attorney’s 
mental impressions could just as easily be used against the 
attorney’s clients in a litigation context as documents produced 
explicitly in anticipation of litigation.  Removing the “anticipation 
of litigation” requirement for “core” work product will also 
COLIN P. MARKS – THE ANTICIPATION  MISCONCEPTION 3/10/2010  11:52:04 AM 
 
73 
 
promote the second, instrumental justification given by the 
Supreme Court.  This justification, rooted in a concern that 
without protection, there would be a detrimental effect on the 
attorney-client relationship, and much of what is written down 
would not be written down, shares much in common with its 
cousin, the attorney-client privilege.  And just as the attorney-
client privilege is not tied to litigation, neither should the 
protection of “core” work product.  While the benefits may appear 
speculative, on balance, this benefit has been sufficient to justify 
the existence of other privileges, and the work product doctrine 
has the added benefit of having a duel justification in its first 
adversarial justification, which is also similar to the humanistic 
privacy justification that has been offered for the attorney-client 
privilege. 
Furthermore, the term “anticipation of litigation” has failed to 
yield a uniform or satisfactory definition – a problem that should 
concern both practitioners and academics alike.  To demonstrate, 
imagine that fictional company ABC Corp., prior to any formal 
governmental investigation, assigns in-house counsel to 
investigate possible accounting irregularities.  In-house counsel 
begins researching cases and statutes and makes notes regarding 
how such authorities could affect the company’s liability.  While 
doing this, in-house counsel also sets up a schedule to interview 
employees and third parties over a four week time frame.  Two 
weeks into the interviews and while research is still being done on 
the legal issues, the SEC and Department of Justice begin a formal 
investigation.  In some jurisdictions, the work product from the 
first two weeks, including the attorney’s notes from the interviews 
would not be protected as the possibility of litigation was remote.  
However, the second two-week period, after the formal 
investigations had begun, would be covered as in “anticipation of 
litigation.”  Such a distinction makes little sense and creates an 
incentive for in-house counsel to avoid writing down his or her 
mental impressions.  Thus, eliminating the “anticipation of 
litigation” requirement for “core” work product in favor of a rule 
that simply protects such documents will help promote some 
degree of uniformity and provide attorneys with a degree of 
certainty about whether their work will be protected.  The 
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inconsistent opinions that have resulted from the “anticipation of 
litigation” requirement have led to results that make distinctions 
without any true meaning.  By simply recognizing that “core” 
work product is deserving of protection regardless of the prospect 
of litigation, so long as it is truly provided as part of an attorney’s 
provision of legal services, should, at the very least, provide courts 
with the ability to grant or deny protection in a more rational 
manner. 
